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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Scope 
This deliverable describes the Security and Privacy Framework of the OpenIoT 
platform, including details about its design and implementation. The aim of this 
framework is to ensure that Internet-Connected Objects (ICOs) contributing to the 
OpenIoT platform, its internal modules and external applications will communicate 
through secured IoT data interfaces (according to the target security/confidentiality 
level specified by the user).  
 
Moreover we show the feasibility of this security module in the implemented 
prototype, which is an integral part of the OpenIoT platform. In particular we describe 
the implementation of the Central Authorisation Server (CAS), the Security 
Management console, the Security Client, and the integration of the security 
framework in the core modules of the platform. 
 
This deliverable is the second and final of a series of two describing the overall 
privacy and security functional framework of OpenIoT.  
1.2  Audience 
This privacy and security framework report and prototype deliverable addresses the 
following audiences: 
 Technical Developers, for sharpening the privacy and security framework 
planning and development; We provide technical details about the integration 
of the security framework in the OpenIoT reference implementation, as well as  
guidelines to integrate with new modules or applications. 
 Business Developers, by taking into account the described privacy and 
securiy components in order to design, implement and fine-tune the 
framework among other components of the OpenIoT architecture, semantic 
infrastructure, management framework, middleware and proof-of-concept 
applications in OpenIoT; 
 The European Commission, in order to assess the OpenIoT progress 
regarding privacy and security perspectives. 
1.3  Methodology 
Security, privacy and trust issues in Internet of Things (IoT) are of fundamental 
importance and guaranteeing the highest standards in those respects is necessary to 
advance the application of (IoT). First of all, any future large-scale deployment of 
OpenIoT will only be possible if it complies with corresponding legal security/privacy 
and reliability requirements (e.g., recent related EU regulations on privacy and 
security). Clearly, apart from the legal requirements, a lack of proper security/privacy 
and trust mechanisms in OpenIoT may lead to disastrous consequences as a result 
of hacking OpenIoT-based systems. As an example, consider pacemakers or insulin 
pumps that start functioning differently (perhaps, maliciously). As another example, 
consider smart meters, where as a result of hacking the bills start going up. One of 
the biggest challenges in designing a proper security/privacy and trust mechanism in 
OpenIoT is the modular and heterogeneous composition of system elements in most 
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existing IoT infrastructures, having very differing security/privacy and reliability 
standards (e.g., fixed versus mobile devices).  
1.4  Related Documents 
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the OpenIoT technology as described in 
the following deliverables: 
 D2.2 OpenIoT Platform Requirements and Technical Specifications. 
 D2.3 OpenIoT Detailed Architecture and Proof-of-Concept Specifications. 
 D3.1.1 Semantic Representations of Internet-Connected Objects a. 
 D3.1.2 Semantic Representations of Internet-Connected Objects b. 
 D3.2 Semantic Communication Protocols (Object/Object and People/Object). 
 D4.1 Service Delivery Environment Formulation Strategies. 
 D4.3.2 Core OpenIoT Middleware Platform b 
 D5.2.1 OpenIoT Privacy and Security Framework a 
1.5  Structure 
This document describes first the foundations of the OpenIoT security framework, 
including secure protocols for information exchange (secure messaging), access 
control, authentication and authorisation. The challenges in designing the 
authentication and authorisation model for OpenIoT stem from the need to 
accommodate differing requirements from the distributed components of the OpenIoT 
platform. Then we describe in detail the implementation of the Security Framework, 
including the OpenIoT CAS server, the Security Client, and the Management console. 
This document presents the final version of the security/privacy and trust 
specification (deliverable), including the description of the final implementation. 
 
The content of this document is a follows: Section 2 reviews the theory of secure 
messaging, Section 3 reviews applicable security protocols, Section 4 reviews the 
theory of access control (authentication and authorisation), Section 5 presents the 
proposed security module in OpenIoT, Section 6 presents details of the proposed 
authorisation framework, Section 7 presents trust mechanisms for IoT, Section 8 
discusses the full implementation of the security framework and Section 9 presents 
the details of the integration with all the core modules of the OpenIoT platform.  
D5.2.2 Privacy and Security Framework b   
 
Copyright  2014 OpenIoT Consortium  10 
2 SECURE MESSAGING 
In this section we review fundamental security concepts that are designed to provide 
secure messaging. The challenges in this area include the necessity to send 
messages preventing that an eavesdropper can intercept and read the information 
embedded in the messages. They are also concerned with mechanisms to obfuscate 
or encrypt the message content in such a way that the receiver can guarantee that 
the message has not been modified by a third party and that it originates from the 
sender it claims to be. 
These concepts and frameworks have been widely implemented in different types of 
systems and platforms, and they are supported in the Java platform [13], in which the 
OpenIoT platform has been developed. The presented concepts are crucial in 
understanding secure protocols discussed in the following sections. In particular we 
review the following ones: 
 Message digests. Technology that ensures the integrity of a transmitted 
message,  along with message authentication codes. 
 Private key encryption. A mechanism designed to ensure the confidentiality 
of a message, based on a private key shared by communicating parties. 
 Public key encryption. A mechanism that allows two parties to share secret 
messages without prior agreement on secret keys. 
 Digital signatures. A pattern that identifies the other party's message as 
coming from the appropriate person. 
 Digital certificates. A technology that adds another level of security to digital 
signatures by having the message certified by a third-party authority. 
2.1  Message digest 
A message digest is a function that generates a unique number or code that 
represents the original message, ensuring the integrity of that message. More 
specifically, message digests take a message as input and generate a block of bits, 
usually several hundred bits long that represents the fingerprint of the message. A 
small change in the message (say, by an interloper or eavesdropper) creates a 
noticeable change in the fingerprint. 
Message-digest functions are one-way functions, so it is generally simple to generate 
the fingerprint from the message, but quite difficult to generate a message for a given 
fingerprint. 
Message digests can be weak or strong. A checksum, which is the XOR of all the 
bytes of a message, is an example of a weak message-digest function. It is easy to 
modify one byte to generate any desired checksum fingerprint. Most strong functions 
use hashing. A 1-bit change in the message leads to a massive change in the 
fingerprint (ideally, 50 percent of the fingerprint bits change). 
If a key is used as part of the message-digest generation, the algorithm is known as 
a message-authentication code. 
2.2  Private key cryptography 
Message digests may ensure integrity of a message, but they can't be used to 
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ensure the confidentiality of a message. For that, private key cryptography has been 
designed to exchange private messages [15,18]. 
Consider this scenario: Alice and Bob each have a shared key that only they know 
and they agree to use a common cryptographic algorithm, or cipher. When Alice 
wants to send a message to Bob, she encrypts the original message, known as 
plaintext, to create ciphertext and then sends the ciphertext to Bob. Bob receives the 
ciphertext from Alice and decrypts the ciphertext with his private key to re-create the 
original plaintext message. If Eve the eavesdropper is listening in on the 
communication, she hears only the ciphertext, so the confidentiality of the message 
is preserved. 
The JDK (Java Development Kit) supports the following private key algorithms [14]: 
 DES. DES (Data Encryption Standard) was invented by IBM in the 1970s and 
adopted by the U.S. government as a standard. It is a 56-bit block cipher [19]. 
 TripleDES. This algorithm is used to deal with the growing weakness of a 56-
bit key while leveraging DES technology by running plaintext through the DES 
algorithm three times, with two keys, giving an effective key strength of 112 
bits. TripleDES is sometimes known as DESede (for encrypt, decrypt, and 
encrypt, which are the three phases). 
 AES. AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) replaces DES as the U.S. 
Standard. It is a 128-bit block cipher with key lengths of 128, 192, or 256 bits 
[20]. 
 RC2, RC4, and RC5. These are algorithms from a leading encryption security 
company, RSA Security. 
 Blowfish. This algorithm is a block cipher with variable key lengths from 32 to 
448 bits (in multiples of 8), and was designed for efficient implementation in 
software for microprocessors. 
 PBE. PBE (Password Based Encryption) can be used in combination with a 
variety of message digest and private key algorithms. The Cipher class 
manipulates private key algorithms using a key produced by the KeyGenerator 
class.  
For example, the following code allows ciphering a message using DES: 
 Cipher c = Cipher.getInstance("DES"); 
 c.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, sKey); 
 
Similarly to decode the message: 
 c.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, sKey); 
 try { 
          String s = (String)so.getObject(c); 
        } catch (Exception e) { 
        // do something 
      
 
The Java security package also includes private key and keystore API methods. For 
example to create a private key: 
 byte[] desKeyData = { (byte)0x01, (byte)0x02, (byte)0x03,  
     (byte)0x04, (byte)0x05, (byte)0x06, (byte)0x07, (byte)0x08 }; 
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 DESKeySpec desKeySpec = new DESKeySpec(desKeyData); 
 SecretKeyFactory keyFactory = SecretKeyFactory.getInstance("DES"); 
 SecretKey secretKey = keyFactory.generateSecret(desKeySpec); 
 
2.3  Public key cryptography 
Private key cryptography suffers from a major drawback, which is the mechanism by 
which the related parties exchange keys. For instance if Alice generates a private 
key, she has to send it to Bob, but it is sensitive information so the key itself should 
be encrypted. However, keys have not been exchanged to perform the encryption 
and we end up in a chicken-egg situation. 
Public key cryptography [15,16] solves the problem of encrypting messages between 
two parties without prior agreement on the key. In fact, in public key cryptography, 
Alice and Bob have different keys (key pairs) which are related. A message encrypted 
with one key can only be decrypted with the other and vice-versa. One key is private 
and must not be shared with anyone. The other key is public and can be shared with 
anyone. When Alice wants to send a secure message to Bob, she encrypts the 
message using Bob's public key and sends the result to Bob. Bob uses his private 
key to decrypt the message. When Bob wants to send a secure message to Alice, he 
encrypts the message using Alice's public key and sends the result to Alice. Alice 
uses her private key to decrypt the message. Eve can eavesdrop on both public keys 
and the encrypted messages, but she cannot decrypt the messages because she 
does not have either of the private keys. 
The public and private keys are generated as a pair and need longer lengths than the 
equivalent-strength private key encryption keys. Typical key lengths for the RSA 
algorithm are 1,024 bits. It is not feasible to derive one member of the key pair from 
the other. 
Public key encryption is slow compared to the private key approaches (100 to 1,000 
times slower than private key encryption), so a hybrid technique is usually used in 
practice. Public key encryption is used to distribute a private key, known as a session 
key, to another party, and then private key encryption using that private session key 
is used for the bulk of the message encryption. 
The following two algorithms are used in public key encryption: 
 RSA. This algorithm is the most popular public key cipher, but it's not 
supported in JDK and one needs to use a third-party library like BouncyCastle 
to get this support. 
 Diffie-Hellman. This algorithm is technically known as a key-agreement 
algorithm. It cannot be used for encryption, but can be used to allow two 
parties to derive a secret key by sharing information over a public channel. 
This key can then be used for private key encryption [21]. 
As an example, the following code shows how to generate a key-pair in Java of size 
1024 [14]: 
 SecureRandom random = SecureRandom.getInstance("SHA1PRNG", "SUN"); 
 random.setSeed(userSeed); 
 keyGen.initialize(1024, random); 
 
The SecureRandom object provides the randomness for the generation of the keys, 
D5.2.2 Privacy and Security Framework b  
 
Copyright  2014 OpenIoT Consortium  13 
and can be customized. Then the keyGen object is ready to generate new key-pairs: 
 KeyPair pair = keyGen.generateKeyPair(); 
2.4  Digital signatures 
Digital signatures are typically used for the task of determining the identification of 
parties that exchange messages. The problem arises from possible impersonation 
attacks, where the receiver wants to know if the sender of an encrypted message 
really is the one who sent the message [15]. The public key message exchange 
described before does not describe or provide a mechanism to perform this type of 
check: e.g.  how can Bob prove that the message really came from Alice? Eve (an 
eavesdropper) could have substituted her public key for Alice's, and then Bob would 
be exchanging messages with Eve thinking she was Alice. This is known as a Man-
in-the-Middle attack. This problem can be solved by using a digital signature, i.e., a 
bit pattern that proves that a message came from a given party. 
One way of implementing a digital signature is using the reverse of the public key 
process. Instead of encrypting with a public key and decrypting with a private key, the 
private key is used by a sender to sign a message and the recipient uses the 
sender's public key to decrypt the message. Because only the sender knows the 
private key, the recipient can be sure that the message really came from the sender. 
Therefore, the message digest, not the entire message, is the bit stream that is 
signed by the private key. So, if Alice wants to send Bob a signed message, she 
generates the message digest of the message and signs it with her private key. She 
sends the message (in the clear) and the signed message digest to Bob. Bob 
decrypts the signed message digest with Alice's public key and computes the 
message digest from the cleartext message and checks that the two digests match. If 
they do, Bob can be sure the message came from Alice. 
Note that digital signatures do not provide encryption of the message, so encryption 
techniques must be used in conjunction with signatures if confidentiality is also 
needed. We can use the RSA algorithm for both digital signatures and encryption. A 
U.S. standard called DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm) can be used for digital 
signatures, but not for encryption. 





We show an example of how to create a signature using the Java cryptography API 
[14]. We first create a signature object with DSA and SHA: 
 Signature dsa = Signature.getInstance("SHA1withDSA"); 
 
Next, using the key pair generated beforehand (e.g. in the key pair example), we 
initialize the object with the private key, then sign a byte array called data.  
 PrivateKey priv = pair.getPrivate(); 
 dsa.initSign(priv); 
 
 /* Update and sign the data */ 
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 dsa.update(data); 
 byte[] sig = dsa.sign(); 
 
Verifying the signature is straightforwardm as seen in the code exerpt below:  
 /* Initializing the object with the public key */ 
 PublicKey pub = pair.getPublic(); 
 dsa.initVerify(pub); 
 
 /* Update and verify the data */ 
 dsa.update(data); 
 boolean verifies = dsa.verify(sig); 
 
2.5  Digital certificates 
Digital certificates introduce a second level to determining the identity of a message 
originator [15]. To do so, this scheme makes use of certificate authorities, which are 
third-parties that provide guarantees about signatures and their originators. We 
examine key and certificate repositories and management tools (keytool and 
keystore) and discuss the CertPath API, a set of functions designed for building and 
validating certification paths. 
In the digital signature scheme described in the previous section there is clearly a 
step missing. The mechanism proves that a given party sent a message, does not 
guarantee that the sender really is who she says she is. For example, what if 
someone claims to be Alice and signs a message, but is actually somebody else? We 
can improve our security by using digital certificates, which package an identity along 
with a public key and are digitally signed by a third party called a certificate authority 
or CA. 
A certificate authority is an organization that verifies the identity (in the real-world) 
of a party and signs that party's public key and identity with the CA private key. A 
message recipient can obtain the sender's digital certificate and verify (or decrypt) it 
with the CA's public key. This proves that the certificate is valid and allows the 
recipient to extract the sender's public key to verify his signature or send him an 
encrypted message. Browsers and the JDK itself come with built-in certificates and 
their public keys from several CAs. The JDK supports the X.509 Digital Certificate 
Standard. For example [14] the following code example reads a file with Base64-
encoded certificates. Each call to generateCertificate consumes only one 
certificate, and the read position of the input stream is positioned to the next 
certificate in the file: 
FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(filename); 
BufferedInputStream bis = new BufferedInputStream(fis); 
 
CertificateFactory cf = CertificateFactory.getInstance("X.509"); 
 
while (bis.available() > 0) { 
    Certificate cert = cf.generateCertificate(bis); 
    System.out.println(cert.toString()); 
} 
The following example parses a PKCS7-formatted certificate reply stored in a file and 
extracts all the certificates from it [14]: 
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FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(filename); 
CertificateFactory cf = CertificateFactory.getInstance("X.509"); 
Collection c = cf.generateCertificates(fis); 
Iterator i = c.iterator(); 
while (i.hasNext()) { 
   Certificate cert = (Certificate)i.next(); 
   System.out.println(cert); 
} 
 
2.5.1  Keytool and keystore 
The Java platform uses a keystore as a repository for keys and certificates [22].  
Physically, the keystore is a file (possibly encrypted) with a default name of keystore. 
Keys and certificates can have names, called aliases, and each alias can be 
protected by a unique password. The keystore itself is also protected by a password; 
you can choose to have each alias password match the master keystore password. 
The Java platform uses the keytool to manipulate the keystore. This tool offers many 
options including generating a public key pair and corresponding certificate, and 
viewing the result by querying the keystore. 
The keytool can be used to export a key into a file, in X.509 format, that can be 
signed by a certificate authority and then re-imported into the keystore. There is also 
a special keystore that is used to hold the certificate authority (or any other trusted) 
certificates, which in turn contains the public keys for verifying the validity of other 
certificates. This keystore is called the truststore. The Java language comes with a 
default truststore in a file called cacerts. If one searches for this filename, he will find 
at least two of these files. One can display the contents with the following command 
issued from Linux (operating system) command shell: 
keytool -list -keystore cacerts 
Use a password of "changeit" 
For example, to create a keystore and generate the key pair, you could use a 
command such as the following [22]:  
    keytool -genkeypair -dname "cn=Mark Jones, ou=JavaSoft, o=Sun, c=US" 
      -alias business -keypass kpi135 -keystore /working/mykeystore 
      -storepass ab987c -validity 180 
 
2.5.2  CertPath API 
The Certification Path API is a set of functions for building and validating certification 
paths or chains. This is done implicitly in protocols like SSL/TLS (see the description 
in the corresponding section) and JAR file signature verification, but can now be 
done explicitly in applications with this support. 
As mentioned in the section on digital certificates, a CA can sign a certificate with its 
private key, and if the recipient holds the CA certificate that has the public key 
needed for signature verification, it can verify the validity of the signed certificate. In 
this case, the chain of certificates is of length two, the anchor of trust (the CA 
certificate) and the signed certificate. A self-signed certificate is of length one, the 
anchor of trust is the signed certificate itself. 
Chains can be of arbitrary length, so in a chain of three, a CA anchor of trust 
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certificate can sign an intermediate certificate; the owner of this certificate can use its 
private key to sign another certificate. The CertPath API can be used to walk the 
chain of certificates to verify validity, as well as to construct these chains of trust. 
Certificates have expiration dates, but can be compromised before they expire, so 
Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL) must be checked to really ensure the integrity of a 
signed certificate. These lists are available on the CA Web sites, and can also be 
programmatically manipulated with the CertPath API. 
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3 SECURITY PROTOCOLS 
In this section we review the most important existing security protocols that are 
essential in OpenIoT. We start from the lowest level and follow by higher levels. 
3.1  IEEE802.15.4 
IEEE802.15.4 is a standard that specifies the physical layer and media access 
control for low-rate wireless personal area networks (LR-WPANs). IEEE 802.15.4 
nodes can operate in either secure mode or non-secure mode. Two security modes 
are defined in the specification in order to achieve different security objectives: 
Access Control List (ACL) and Secure mode. The MAC sublayer offers facilities that 
can be harnessed by upper layers to achieve the desired level of security. Higher-
layer processes may specify keys to perform symmetric cryptography to protect the 
payload and restrict it to a group of devices or just a point-to-point link; these groups 
of devices can be specified in access control lists. Furthermore, MAC computes 
freshness checks between successive receptions to ensure that presumably old 
frames, or data that is no longer considered valid, does not transcend to higher 
layers [14]. 
In addition to this secure mode, there is another, insecure MAC mode, which allows 
access control lists merely as a means to decide on the acceptance of frames 
according to their (presumed) source. 
3.2  IPsec 
Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) [1] is a technology protocol suite for securing 
Internet Protocol (IP) communications by authenticating and/or encrypting each IP 
packet of a communication session. IPsec also includes protocols for establishing 
mutual authentication between agents at the beginning of the session and 
negotiation of cryptographic keys to be used during the session. 
IPsec is an end-to-end security scheme operating in the Internet Layer of the Internet 
Protocol Suite. It can be used for protecting data flows between a pair of hosts (host-
to-host), between a pair of security gateways (network-to-network), or between a 
security gateway and a host (network-to-host). 
Some other Internet security systems in widespread use, such as Secure Sockets 
Layer (SSL), Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Secure Shell (SSH), operate in the 
upper layers of the TCP/IP model. In the past, the use of TLS/SSL had to be 
designed into an application to protect application protocols. In contrast, since day 
one, applications did not need to be specifically designed to use IPsec. Hence, IPsec 
protects any application traffic across an IP network. 
The IPsec suite is an open standard and it uses the following protocols to perform 
various functions: 
 Authentication Headers (AH) provide connectionless integrity and data origin 
authentication for IP datagrams and provides protection against replay attacks. 
 Encapsulating Security Payloads (ESP) provide confidentiality, data-origin 
authentication, connectionless integrity, an anti-replay service (a form of partial 
sequence integrity), and limited traffic-flow confidentiality.  
 Security Associations (SA) provide the bundle of algorithms and data that 
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provide the parameters necessary to operate the AH and/or ESP operations. 
The Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) 
provides a framework for authentication and key exchange, with actual 
authenticated keying material provided either by manual configuration with 
pre-shared keys, Internet Key Exchange (IKE and IKEv2), Kerberized Internet 
Negotiation of Keys (KINK), or IPSECKEY DNS records.  
Cryptographic algorithms defined for use with IPsec include: 
 HMAC-SHA1 for integrity protection and authenticity.  
 TripleDES-CBC for confidentiality  
 AES-CBC for confidentiality.  
3.3  TSL 
Transport Layer Security (TSL) [23,2,26] and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) [24], 
are cryptographic protocols that provide communication security over the Internet, 
TLS/SSL can be used to authenticate servers and clients and then use it to encrypt 
messages between the authenticated parties. They use public-key cryptography for 
authentication of key exchange, private-key encryption for confidentiality and 
message authentication codes for message integrity. TSL operates in the Application 
Layer of the IP Protocol Suite. The TLS protocol allows client-server applications to 
communicate across a network in a way designed to prevent eavesdropping and 
tampering. 
Since protocols can operate either with or without TLS (or SSL) [26], it is necessary 
for the client to indicate to the server whether it wants to set up a TLS connection or 
not. There are two main ways of achieving this; one option is to use a different port 
number for TLS connections (for example port 443 for HTTPS). The other is to use 
the regular port number and have the client request that the server switch the 
connection to TLS using a protocol specific mechanism (for example STARTTLS for 
mail and news protocols). 
Once the client and server have decided to use TLS, they negotiate a stateful 
connection by using a handshaking procedure. During this handshake, the client and 
server agree on various parameters used to establish the connection's security: 
1. The client sends the server the client's SSL version number, cipher 
settings, session-specific data, and other information that the server 
needs to communicate with the client using SSL.  
2. The server sends the client the server's SSL version number, cipher 
settings, session-specific data, and other information that the client 
needs to communicate with the server over SSL. The server also sends 
its own certificate, and if the client is requesting a server resource that 
requires client authentication, the server requests the client's certificate.  
3. The client uses the information sent by the server to authenticate the 
server. If the server cannot be authenticated, the user is warned of the 
problem and informed that an encrypted and authenticated connection 
cannot be established. If the server can be successfully authenticated, 
the client proceeds to the next step.  
4. Using all data generated in the handshake thus far, the client (with the 
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cooperation of the server, depending on the cipher in use) creates the 
pre-master secret for the session, encrypts it with the server's public 
key (obtained from the server's certificate, sent in step 2), and then 
sends the encrypted pre-master secret to the server.  
5. If the server has requested client authentication (an optional step in the 
handshake), the client also signs another piece of data that is unique to 
this handshake and known by both the client and server. In this case, 
the client sends both the signed data and the client's own certificate to 
the server along with the encrypted pre-master secret.  
6. If the server has requested client authentication, the server attempts to 
authenticate the client. If the client cannot be authenticated, the session 
ends. If the client can be successfully authenticated, the server uses its 
private key to decrypt the pre-master secret, and then performs a series 
of steps (which the client also performs, starting from the same pre-
master secret) to generate the master secret.  
7. Both the client and the server use the master secret to generate the 
session keys, which are symmetric keys used to encrypt and decrypt 
information exchanged during the SSL session and to verify its integrity 
(that is, to detect any changes in the data between the time it was sent 
and the time it is received over the SSL connection).  
8. The client sends a message to the server informing it that future 
messages from the client will be encrypted with the session key. It then 
sends a separate (encrypted) message indicating that the client portion 
of the handshake is finished.  
9. The server sends a message to the client informing it that future 
messages from the server will be encrypted with the session key. It then 
sends a separate (encrypted) message indicating that the server portion 
of the handshake is finished.  
The SSL handshake is now complete and the session begins. The client and the 
server use the session keys to encrypt and decrypt the data they send to each other 
and to validate its integrity. 
This is the normal operation condition of the secure channel. At any time, due to 
internal or external stimulus (either automation or user intervention), either side may 
renegotiate the connection, in which case, the process repeats itself. 
This concludes the handshake and begins the secured connection, which is 
encrypted and decrypted with the key material until the connection closes. If any one 
of the above steps fails, the TLS handshake fails and the connection is not created. 
In step 3, the client must check a chain of "signatures" from a "root of trust" built into, 
or added to, the client. The client must also check that none of these have been 
revoked; this is not often implemented correctly, but is a requirement of any public-
key authentication system. If the particular signer beginning this server's chain is 
trusted, and all signatures in the chain remain trusted, then the Certificate (thus the 
server) is trusted. 
Java provides support for TLS/SSL and most Java-based web application 
frameworks include native support that can be used straight-away by hosted 
applications. In case of need, the Java API also provides low-level methods to create 
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a SSL Socket Server and receive messages securely by a client. For example, the 
following code shows how to create a SSL socket server and listen to messages: 
SSLServerSocketFactory ssf = (SSLServerSocketFactory) SSLServerSocketF
actory.getDefault(); 
    ServerSocket ss = ssf.createServerSocket(5432); 
    while (true) { 
      Socket s = ss.accept(); 
      PrintStream out = new PrintStream(s.getOutputStream()); 
      out.println("Hi"); 
      out.close(); 
      s.close(); 
    } 
3.4  HTTPS 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) [3,17] is a protocol for secure 
communication over a computer network, widely deployed on Internet. More 
precisely, it is not a protocol itself but it is rather the result of layering the Hypertext 
Transfer Protocol (HTTP) on top of SSL/TLS. HTTPS protects against man-in-the-
middle attacks by providing authentication of the web site and associated web server 
that one is communicating with. Additionally, it provides bidirectional encryption of 
communications between a client and server, which protects against eavesdropping 
and tampering with and/or forging the contents of the communication. In practice, this 
provides a reasonable guarantee that one is communicating with precisely the web 
site that one intended to communicate with (as opposed to an imposter), as well as 
ensuring that the contents of communications between the user and site cannot be 
read or forged by any third party. 
A site must be completely hosted over HTTPS, without having some of its contents 
loaded over HTTP, or the user will be vulnerable to some attacks and surveillance. 
For example, having scripts etc. loaded insecurely on an HTTPS page makes the 
user vulnerable to attacks. Also having only a certain page that contains sensitive 
information (such as a log-in page) of a website loaded over HTTPS, while having 
the rest of the website loaded over plain HTTP will expose the user to attacks. On a 
site that has sensitive information somewhere on it, every time that site is accessed 
with HTTP instead of HTTPS, the user and the session will get exposed. Similarly, 
cookies on a site served through HTTPS have to have the secure attribute enabled. 
HTTPS is a URI scheme which has identical syntax to the standard HTTP scheme, 
aside from its scheme token. However, HTTPS signals the browser to use an added 
encryption layer of SSL/TLS to protect the traffic. SSL is especially suited for HTTP 
since it can provide some protection even if only one side of the communication is 
authenticated. This is the case with HTTP transactions over the Internet, where 
typically only the server is authenticated (by the client examining the server's 
certificate). 
HTTPS creates a secure channel over an insecure network. This ensures reasonable 
protection from eavesdroppers and man-in-the-middle attacks, provided that 
adequate cipher suites are used and that the server certificate is verified and trusted. 
Because HTTPS piggybacks HTTP entirely on top of TLS, the entirety of the 
underlying HTTP protocol can be encrypted. This includes the request URL (which 
particular web page was requested), query parameters, headers, and cookies (which 
often contain identity information about the user). However, because host (web site) 
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addresses and port numbers are necessarily part of the underlying TCP/IP protocols, 
HTTPS cannot protect their disclosure. In practice this means that even on a 
correctly configured web server eavesdroppers can still infer the IP address and port 
number of the web server (sometimes even the domain name e.g. www.example.org, 
but not the rest of the URL) that one is communicating with as well as the amount 
(data transferred) and duration (length of session) of the communication, though not 
the content of the communication. 
Web browsers know how to trust HTTPS websites based on certificate authorities 
that come pre-installed in their software. Certificate authorities (e.g. 
VeriSign/Microsoft/etc.) are in this way being trusted by web browser creators to 
provide valid certificates. Logically, it follows that a user should trust an HTTPS 
connection to a website if and only if all of the following are true: 
 The user trusts that the browser software correctly implements HTTPS with 
correctly pre-installed certificate authorities.  
 The user trusts the certificate authority to vouch only for legitimate websites.  
 The website provides a valid certificate, which means it was signed by a 
trusted authority.  
 The certificate correctly identifies the website (e.g., when the browser visits 
"https://example.com", the received certificate is proper for "Example Inc." and 
not some other entity).  
 Either the intervening hops on the Internet are trustworthy, or the user trusts 
that the protocol's encryption layer (TLS/SSL) is sufficiently secure against 
eavesdroppers.  
HTTPS is especially important over unencrypted networks (such as WiFi), as anyone 
on the same local network can "packet sniff" and discover sensitive information. 
Additionally, many free to use and even paid for WLAN networks do packet injection 
for serving their own ads on webpages or just for pranks, however this can be 
exploited maliciously e.g. by injecting malware and spying on users. 
Another example where HTTPS is important is connections over Tor (anonymity 
network), as malicious Tor nodes can damage or alter the contents passing through 
them in an insecure fashion and inject malware into the connection. This is one 
reason why the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Torproject started the 
development of HTTPS Everywhere, which is included in the Tor Browser Bundle. 
In most Java-based web application frameworks, SSL and HTTPS are provided via 
configuration, and are orthogonal to the application itself. As an example, in JBoss 
(where the OpenIoT platform demonstrator has been tested) this can be achieved 
following the steps documented in the official web site1. 
                                            
1 https://docs.jboss.org/jbossweb/3.0.x/ssl-howto.html 
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4 ACCESS CONTROL  
In this section we review the fundamental concepts of access control [28,27,18], 
including the fundamental concepts of identities, authentication and authorisation. 
Access control mechanisms are security features that manage the way how users 
and systems communicate with other systems and resources, respecting policies of 
information flow, as we will see. 
4.1  Fundamental concepts 
Access control is a selective restriction of access to resource and includes the 
following components: authentication, authorisation, access approval and 
accountability. The Access can be interpreted as the flow of information between a 
subject (i.e. an active entity requesting access) and an object (a passive entity that 
contain information to be accessed). Subjects and objects should both be considered 
as software entities, rather than as human users: any human user can only have an 
effect on the system via the software entities that they control. 
Access controls give organization the ability to control, restrict, monitor, and protect 
resource availability, integrity and confidentiality. Access control consists of the 
different sub-processes detailed below [27]. 
 Identification is a method of ensuring that a subject is the entity it claims to be, 
e.g. assign an identity to a subject.  
 Authentication is the process of verifying that an identity is bound to the entity 
that makes an assertion or claim of identity (i.e., verifying that "you are who you 
say you are"). Authenticators are commonly based on “something you know”, 
such as a password or a personal identification number (PIN). This assumes that 
only the owner of the account knows the password or PIN needed to access the 
account. 
 Authorisation is the act of defining access rights for subjects. An authorisation 
policy specifies the operations that subjects are allowed to execute on the 
system. 
 Access approval is the function that actually grants or rejects access during 
operations. During access approval the system compares the formal 
representation of the authorisation policy with the access request to determine 
whether the request shall be granted or rejected. 
 Accountability uses such system components as audit trails (records) and logs 
to associate a subject with its actions. The information recorded should be 
sufficient to map the subject to a controlling user. Audit trails and logs are 
important for detecting security violations and re-creating security incidents  
Two most widely recognized access control models are Discretionary Access 
Control (DAC) and Mandatory Access Control (MAC). 
 Discretionary Access Control (DAC) [30] is a policy determined by the owner 
of an object. The owner decides who is allowed to access the object and what 
privileges they have. Two important concepts in DAC are: 
o File and data ownership: Every object in the system has an owner. In 
most DAC systems, each object's initial owner is the subject that 
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caused it to be created. The access policy for an object is determined 
by its owner.  
o Access rights and permissions: These are the controls that an owner 
can assign to other subjects for specific resources.  
 Mandatory Access Control (MAC) [31] refers to allowing access to a resource if 
and only if rules exist that allow a given user to access the resource. It is difficult 
to manage but its use is usually justified when used to protect highly sensitive 
information. Examples include certain government and military information. 
Management of MAC is often implemented by using sensitivity labels. In such a 
system subjects and objects must have labels assigned to them. A subject's 
sensitivity label specifies its level of trust. An object's sensitivity label specifies 
the level of trust required for access. In order to access a given object, the 
subject must have a sensitivity level equal to or higher than the requested object.  
Two methods are commonly used for implementing mandatory access control using 
sensitivity labels: 
 Rule-based access control: This type of control further defines specific 
conditions for access to a requested object. A Mandatory Access Control system 
implements a simple form of rule-based access control to determine whether 
access should be granted or denied by matching:  
1. An object's sensitivity label  
2. A subject's sensitivity label  
 Lattice-based access control: A lattice is used to define the levels of security 
that an object may have and that a subject may have access to. The subject is 
only allowed to access an object if the security level of the subject is greater than 
or equal to that of the object. A lattice model is a mathematical structure that 
defines greatest lower-bound (meet) and least upper-bound (join) values for a pair 
of elements, such as a subject and an object. For example, if two subjects A and 
B need access to an object, the security level is defined as the meet of the levels 
of A and B. In another example, if two objects X and Y are combined, they form 
another object Z, which is assigned the security level formed by the join of the 
levels of X and Y. 
Access Control Matrix or Access Matrix is an abstract, formal security of 
protection state in computer systems, that characterize the rights of each subject with 
respect to every object in the system. More formally, access matrix is defined as a set 
of objects O, that is the set of entities that needs to be protected (e.g., processes, 
files, memory pages) and a set of subjects S, that consists of all active entities (e.g., 
users, processes). Further there exists a set of rights R of the form r(s, o), where s in 
S,  o in O and r(s, o) in R, where a right specifies the kind of access a subject is 
allowed to process object. Consider the following example of a matrix where there 
exist two subjects (Role1 and Role2) the following objects: asset1, asset2, file and a 
device. Table 1 presents an example access matrix.  
Table 1. An example access matrix 
 asset 1 asset 2 file device 
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Role1 read, write, execute, own execute read write 
Role2 Read 




In general, all subjects are objects but the inverse is not true. Thus, the cell for row s 
and column o, [s, o], denotes the set of rights of subject s to perform an operation on 
object o (e.g., read in [s, o]). Thus, all users in the access matrix are represented by 
their corresponding subjects. The access matrix is a dynamic entity and its individual 
cells can be modified by subjects. For example, if subject s is the owner of object o 
then s can modify the content of cells corresponding to o. In such a case the owner 
of the object has complete discretion regarding the access to the owned object by 
other subjects. Such an access control model is called discretionary. The access 
matrix is usually sparse and is stored in a system using access control lists, 
capabilities, relations or another data structure suitable for efficient sparse matrix 
storage. 
An access control list (ACL), with respect to a computer system, is a list of 
permissions attached to an object. An ACL specifies which users or system 
processes are granted access to objects, as well as what operations are allowed on 
given objects. Each entry in a typical ACL specifies a subject and an operation. For 
instance, if a file has an ACL that contains (Alice, delete), this would give Alice 
permission to delete the file. 
4.2  Lattice-Based Access Control Models 
In this section we review foundations of lattice-based access control models given 
the importance of lattice-based access control systems [6]. 
A security of computer system has the following interdependent objectives: 
 Confidentiality (or secrecy) related to disclosure of information, i.e., 
preventing users from learning about data of other users. 
 Integrity, related to modification of information, i.e., preventing a user from 
changing data of other users. 
 Availability related to denial of access to information, i.e., ensuring that 
requested data is delivered on time. 
 Non-repudiation related to providing a proof of the integrity and origin of data. 
Lattice-based access control models were developed to deal with information flow in 
computer system. Although developed for the defence sector they can be used in 
most cases where information flow is critical. Therefore they are a key component of 
computer security. 
4.2.1  Information flow policy 
Information flow policies are concerned with the flow of information from one security 
class to another. In particular in a computer system this information flaws from one 
object to another, where object is defined as a container of information (e.g., files and 
directories in an operating system). 
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Information flow is controlled by assigning every object a security class also called a 
security label. If information flows from object x to object y, it implies information flow 
from the security class of x to the security class of y. Thus, an information flow from 
one class to another, concerns the corresponding objects. 
An information flow policy can be formally defined as follows:  
 SC is the set of security classes 
 A ->B is a binary relation on SC called “flows”, where A, B is in SC. Thus, the 
information flows from security class A to security class B.  
 A + B = C is a binary class combination or join operation, where C is in SC. Thus, 
the join operation specifies how to label information obtained by combining 
information from two security classes A and B, where C is the resulting class. 
 '>=' is the dominance operator, where A >= B (A dominates B) if and only if B->A. 
The strict dominates relation > is defined by A > B if A >=B and A <> B. Thus, if 
A > B then B->A. 
Then the definition of A + B is just the maximum with respect to A and B. Thus, if 
information from two security classes is combined the label of the higher of the 
two is used for the result.  
 As an example consider High-low policy defined as follows: SC={H, L}, the 
flow relations is H->H, L->L, L->H and the join is defined as follows: H+H=H, L+H=H, 
L+L=L. 
 As another example of security classes consider SC={TS: top secret, S: 
secret, C: confidential, U: unclassified} and the total (linear) ordering of the security 
classes as follows: U->S->C->TS meaning TS >S>C>U and A+B is the maximum 
with respect to the dominance relation. 
4.3  Access control models-based on information flow 
Recall, that a user is defined as a human being assigned a unique user id in the 
system. A subject is a process in the system (a program in execution), where each 
subject is associated with a single user. In general a user can have several subjects 
concurrently running in the system. Thus, every time a user logs into the system it 
does so as a particular subject. (Note that access control models assume that 
identification and authentication of users takes place in a secure and correct manner. 
Different subjects associated with the same user can obtain different sets of access 
rights. For example, top secret user Bob logs in at the secret level. Then Bob can 
have subjects running at different levels dominated by the top secret class.  
The discretionary access control model is not adequate for enforcing information flow 
policies because they provide no constraints on copying information from one object 
to another. For an illustration of this property consider the following example. 
EXAMPLE 1. Suppose that Tom, Dick and Harry are users and Tom has a 
confidential file Private that he wants Dick to read but does not want Harry to read. 
Tom can authorize Dick to read the file by entering read(Dick, Private) in the access 
matrix. Dick can easily subvert Tom's intention by creating a new file called Copy-of-
Private and copying the contents of Private into it. As the creator of Copy-of-Private, 
Dick has the authority to grant read access for it to any user including Harry. Thus, 
Dick can enter read (Harry,Copy-of-Private) in the access matrix. Then Harry can 
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read Private.  
4.3.1  Mandatory access policy 
The key idea of the mandatory access control model that we present in this section is 
to augment discretionary access controls with mandatory access controls to enforce 
information flow policies.  
Thus, we take a two-step approach to access control. First a discretionary access 
matrix D, whose contents can be modified by subjects, is used, where authorisation 
in D is not sufficient for an operation to be carried out. Second, the operation must be 
authorized by the mandatory access control policy over which users have no control.  
4.3.2  Confidentiality 
Mandatory access control policy is expressed in terms of security labels attached to 
subjects (security classification) and objects (security clearance). Thus, a user 
labelled secrete can run the same program such as text editor, as a subject labelled 
secret or as a subject labelled unclassified. Even though both subjects run the same 
program on behalf of the same user they both obtain different privileges due to their 
security labels. The assumption called tranquillity says that the security labels on 
subjects and objects cannot be changed.  
Let L be the security label (confidentiality) of a given subject or object. Then 
mandatory access rules can be expressed as follows: 
 Subject s can read an object o only if L(s) >= L(o), meaning L(o) -> L(s), i.e., o 
flows to s. 
 Subject s can write object o only if L(s) <= L(o), meaning L(s)->L(o), i.e., s flows to 
o. 
The mandatory checks are only applied if the checks of the discretionary matrix have 
been satisfied. If the matrix does not authorize the operation then we do not check 
the mandatory controls.  
These security requirements apply to humans and programs equally. The write 
property is not applied to humans but to programs. Human users are trusted not to 
leak information. A secret user can write unclassified document because we assume 
that he will put only unclassified information in it. 
Programs are not trusted because they can have embedded Trojan Horses. The write 
property prohibits a program running at a secrete level from writing to unclassified 
objects even if it is permitted to do so by discretionary access control. A user labelled 
secret can write to an unclassified object must log as an unclassified subject. 
Now consider how the presented properties impact Example 1. Clearly the read 
property will prevent Harry's subjects from being able to directly read the file Private. 
The presented write property will ensure that Harry's subjects cannot surreptitiously 
read Copy-of-Private because it will either be labelled secret or will not contain any 
information from Private. 
4.3.3  Integrity 
The presented model can be extended to handle integrity. The concept of integrity 
says that low-integrity information should not be allowed to flow to high-integrity 
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objects. Let W denote the integrity label of a subject or object. A particular mandatory 
integrity rules can be expressed as follows: 
 Subject s can read an object o only if W(s) <= W(o), meaning W(s) -> W(o), i.e., s 
flows to o. 
 Subject s can write an object o only if W(s) >= L(o), meaning W(o) -> W(s), i.e., o 
flows to s. 
4.3.4  Combined 
It is often suggested that the confidentiality and integrity models could be combined 
in situations where both confidentiality and integrity are of concern. If a single label 
were used for both, confidentiality and integrity then a model would impose 
conflicting constraints. Therefore, a model with independent confidentiality and 
integrity labels is more useful in practice. In such a model each security class 
consists of two labels: a confidentiality label L and an integrity label W with 
independent controls applied to them. We assume that that in both lattices high 
confidentiality and high integrity are at the top.  
Example combined confidentiality and integrity mandatory rules can be expressed as 
follows: 
 Subject s can read an object o only if L(s) => L(o) and W(s) <= W(o) 
 Subject s can write an object o only if L(s) <= L(o) and W(s) >= W(o) 
This popular combined model has been implemented in several operating system, 
database and network products specifically built to meet requirements of the military 
sector. Thus, this model amounts to the simultaneous application of two lattices, with 
information flow, occurring in opposite directions (going upward in the confidentiality 
lattice and downward in the integrity lattice). 
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5 THE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN OPENIOT 
In this section we present the proposed security architecture in OpenIoT that 
accommodates the specifics/requirements of the OpenIoT platform.  
5.1  Overview of the architecture 
Clearly, the OpenIoT platform consist of several cooperating distributed standalone 
applications (e.g., SDUM, X-GSN, LSM, etc.) that require individual security 
(authentication and authorisation) services because of differing subjects and objects 
that they deal with. Therefore, we propose a central authorisation and authentication 
server that provides authentication and authorisation services for all relevant 
OpenIoT applications running on behalf of different subjects. 
  
Figure 1. Security Architecture in OpenIoT. 
The main feature of this architecture is that user credentials (username/password) 
are only checked and maintained by Central Authorisation Server (CAS) and it 
authorizes applications running on behalf a user by granting them an access token 
with a given time to live. This prevents any circulation of the credentials throughout 
OpenIoT components.  Furthermore, the architecture has to be open to external 
security schemes that are more flexible or secure (or both) than the default security 
model. Note that the security and performance are usually orthogonal features and 
strong security means lower performance and vice-versa. Therefore, our ultimate 
objective is to design a scheme where security can be traded for performance.  
Figure 1 presents an overview of the security architecture in the OpenIoT 
architecture. 
In particular, CAS architecture considers the following roles: 
 Resource owner: e.g., an owner of sensor data in LSM that grants access to 
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the data for Service Delivery and Utility Manager (SDUM).  
 Resource server: e.g., Sensor Data Cloud Database (LSM). 
 Client: e.g., SDUM querying LSM on behalf of a resource owner. In general, 
Client consists of the distributed set of OpenIoT components that use the 
corresponding token to get access to the data of the corresponding Resource 
owner in LSM. 
 Authorisation server: CAS issuing access tokens to a client after successfully 
authenticating the resource owner and obtaining authorisation. 
The Clients that directly authenticate with CAS are:  
 Request Definition: where a user defines a request (query) and upon 
authentication the other clients (e.g., SCH, LSM, Request Presentation) get a 
corresponding token to accomplish their tasks. 
 CMC: where the administrator is authenticated to accomplish his tasks. 
 X-GSN: where sensor data providers are authenticated to stream the 
corresponding data to LSM. 
The details of the CAS architecture are presented in Section 6.  
5.2  Access matrix 
The utilized access matrix consists of the following subjects and objects. The roles 
are as follows: 
 Administrator: This role gains access to the entire OpenIoT platform. All the 
actions of the different modules will be available to administrators. 
Administrators will also have access to all available GUIs. 
 User: The user role is the most common and the most used role of the access 
control model. After creating an account, the user will gain access to a specific 
list of possible actions. The user will have access to the request definition and 
the request presentation GUIs. 
The considered objects are as follows: 
1. Physical sensor (PS). 
2. Virtual sensors (VS). 
3. Internet Connected Object (ICO). 
4. Services related to the components (e.g., SDUM, SCH and LSM operations). 
A fragment of the access matrix as a relation is presented in Table 2.  
Table 2. A fragment of the access matrix in OpenIoT. 
Role Relation r(o) 
Administrator setup(VS), setup(PS), setup(LSM), setup(SCH), setup(SDUM), 
write(LSM), read(LSM), ..., etc. 
User read(VS), read(PS), read(GUI), ..., etc. 
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5.3  Mandatory access rules 
We consider the following security classes 
 TS: top secret 
 C: confidential. 
Security classes assignment to roles is presented in Table 3.  
Table 3. Security classes and roles in OpenIoT. 
Role Security class (confidentiality label) 
Administrator TS: top secret 
User C: confidential 
 
We adapt the confidentiality rules as trust rules from Section 4. 3. 
5.4  Security protocol stack 
The security protocol stack in OpenIoT is presented in Table 4, where 
The layers refer to corresponding communication between the following components: 
Layer 1: sensors and GSN, Layer 2: GSN and LSM and Layer 3: other OpenIoT 
components (e.g., LSM and SDUM). 
Table 4. The security protocol stack in OpenIoT. 
 Layer/Link Security/privacy solution 
1. Sensor->GSN Ipsec (wired networks), IEEE802.15.4 (wireless networks) 





Clearly, the OpenIoT platform relies entirely on the TSL/HTTPS protocol to ensure 
secure (encrypted) messaging, while IEEE802.15.4, Ipsec guarantees secure sensor 
data.  
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6 AUTHORISATION FRAMEWORK 
In this section we review the OAuth [4, 5, 12] authorisation framework that  is used to 
provide authorisation to OpenIoT modules on behalf of a user. 
We chose OAuth as our authorisation framework for the following reasons: 
 From the point of view of OpenIoT the most important fact about OAuth 
is that it describes a method for providing authorisation in a distributed 
environment, where distributed client applications get access to owner's 
resources using time-stamped tokens to avoid transmitting credentials 
(username, password) to the client applications. 
 OAuth is an open standard for authorisation, i.e., publicly available, and 
developed, approved and maintained via a collaborative and consensus 
driven process. 
 OAuth is more like a framework (not a defined protocol), which leaves a 
lot of implementation freedom that we need because of non-standard 
requirements in OpenIoT. For example, for some OpenIoT applications 
involving mobile phones as sensors it is important to have time stamped 
and location-restricted access tokens. 
 OAuth is the only framework in its genre and is widely used for similar 
applications. 
Furthermore, OAuth is a result of standardization and combined wisdom of many 
well-established industry protocols. It is similar to other protocols currently in use 
(Google AuthSub, AOL OpenAuth, Yahoo BBAuth, Flickr API, Amazon Web Services 
API, etc). Each protocol provides a proprietary method for exchanging user 
credentials for an access token or ticker. OAuth was created by carefully studying 
each of these protocols and extracting the best practices and commonality that allow 
new implementations as well as a smooth transition for existing services to support 
Oauth [12]. 
An area, where OAuth is more evolved than some of the other protocols and services 
is its direct handling of non-website services. OAuth was built in support for desktop 
applications, mobile devices, set-top boxes, and of course websites. Many of the 
protocols today use a shared secret hardcoded into software but such an approach 
may pose an issue when the service trying to access private data is open source 
[12].  In the following part of Section 6 the most important excerpts from the OAuth 
2.0 framework specification [5] are introduced and discussed. 
6.1  Introduction 
In the traditional client-server authentication model, the client requests an access-
restricted resource (protected resource) on the server by authenticating with the 
server using the resource owner's credentials. In order to provide third-party 
applications access to restricted resources, the resource owner shares its credentials 
with the third party. 
This creates several problems and limitations: 
 Third-party applications are required to store the resource owner's   
credentials for future use, typically a password in clear-text. 
D5.2.2 Privacy and Security Framework b   
 
Copyright  2014 OpenIoT Consortium  32 
 Servers are required to support password authentication, despite 
the security weaknesses inherent in passwords. 
 Third-party applications gain overly broad access to the resource       
owner's protected resources, leaving resource owners without any       
ability to restrict duration or access to a limited subset of resources. 
 Resource owners cannot revoke access to an individual third party       
without revoking access to all third parties, and must do so by 
changing the third party's password. 
 Compromise of any third-party application results in compromise of 
the end-user's password and all of the data protected by that 
password. 
OAuth addresses these issues by introducing an authorisation layer and separating 
the role of the client from that of the resource owner.  In OAuth, the client requests 
access to resources controlled by the resource owner and hosted by the resource 
server, and is issued a different set of credentials than those of the resource owner. 
Instead of using the resource owner's credentials to access protected resources, the 
client obtains an access token a string denoting a specific scope, lifetime, and other 
access attributes. An authorisation server with the approval of the resource owner 
issues access tokens to third-party clients. The client uses the access token to 
access the protected resources hosted by the resource server. 
For example, an end-user (resource owner) can grant a printing service (client) 
access to her protected photos stored at a photo-sharing service (resource server), 
without sharing her username and password with the printing service.  Instead, she 
authenticates directly with a server trusted by the photo-sharing service    
(authorisation server), which issues the printing service delegation-specific 
credentials (access token). 
6.2  Roles 
OAuth defines four roles: 
1. Resource owner: an entity capable of granting access to a protected 
resource. When the resource owner is a person, it is referred to as an end-
user. 
2. Resource server: the server hosting the protected resources, capable of 
accepting and responding to protected resource requests using access 
tokens. 
3. Client: an application making protected resource requests on behalf of the       
resource owner and with its authorisation. The term "client" does not imply any 
particular implementation characteristics (e.g., whether the application 
executes on a server, a desktop, or other devices). 
4. Authorisation server: the server issuing access tokens to the client after 
successfully authenticating the resource owner and obtaining authorisation. 
The interaction between the authorisation server and resource server is beyond the 
scope of this specification. The authorisation server may be the same server as the 
resource server or a separate entity. A single authorisation server may issue access 
tokens accepted by multiple resource servers. 
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Figure 2. Abstract Protocol Flow. 
6.3  OAuth Protocol Flow 
The abstract Oauth 2.0 flow illustrated in Figure 2 describes the interaction between 
the four roles and includes the following steps: 
A) The client requests authorisation from the resource owner. The         
authorisation request can be made directly to the resource owner         
(as shown), or preferably indirectly via the authorisation server as an 
intermediary. 
B) The client receives an authorisation grant, which is a credential 
representing the resource owner's authorisation, expressed using one of 
four grant types defined in this specification or using an extension grant 
type. The authorisation grant type depends on the method used by the         
client to request authorisation and the types supported by the         
authorisation server.  
C) The client requests an access token by authenticating with the         
authorisation server and presenting the authorisation grant. 
D) The authorisation server authenticates the client and validates the 
authorisation grant, and if valid, issues an access token. 
E) The client requests the protected resource from the resource server and 
authenticates by presenting the access token. 
F) The resource server validates the access token, and if valid, serves the 
request. 
The preferred method for the client to obtain an authorisation grant from the resource 
owner (depicted in steps (A) and (B)) is to use the authorisation server as an 
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intermediary as in Figure 3. 
6.3.1  Authorisation Grant 
An authorisation grant is a credential representing the resource owner's authorisation 
(to access its protected resources) used by the client to obtain an access token. This 
specification defines four grant types: authorisation code, implicit, resource owner 
password credentials, and client credentials as well as an extensibility mechanism for 
defining additional types. 
6.3.2  Authorisation Code 
The authorisation code is obtained by using an authorisation server as an 
intermediary between the client and resource owner. Instead of requesting 
authorisation directly from the resource owner, the client directs the resource owner 
to an authorisation server, which in turn directs the resource owner back to the client 
with the authorisation code. 
Before directing the resource owner back to the client with the authorisation code, the 
authorisation server authenticates the resource owner and obtains authorisation. 
Because the resource owner only authenticates with the authorisation server, the 
resource owner's credentials are never shared with the client. 
The authorisation code provides a few important security benefits, such as the ability 
to authenticate the client, as well as the transmission of the access token directly to 
the client without passing it through the resource owner's user-agent and potentially 
exposing it to others, including the resource owner. 
The authorisation code grant type is used to obtain both access tokens and refresh 
tokens and is optimized for confidential clients. Since this is a redirection-based flow, 
the client must be capable of interacting with the resource owner's user-agent 
(typically a web browser) and capable of receiving incoming requests (via redirection) 














Figure 3. Authorisation Code Flow. 
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The flow illustrated in Figure 3 includes the following steps: 
A) The client initiates the flow by directing the resource owner's user-
agent to the authorisation endpoint. The client includes its client 
identifier, requested scope, local state, and a redirection URI to which 
the authorisation server will send the user-agent back once access is 
granted (or denied). 
B) The authorisation server authenticates the resource owner (via the 
user-agent) and establishes whether the resource owner grants or 
denies the client's access request. 
C) Assuming the resource owner grants access, the authorisation         
server redirects the user-agent back to the client using the         
redirection URI provided earlier (in the request or during client 
registration). The redirection URI includes an authorisation code and 
any local state provided by the client earlier. 
D) The client requests an access token from the authorisation server's 
token endpoint by including the authorisation code received in the 
previous step. When making the request, the client authenticates with 
the authorisation server. The client includes the redirection URI used 
to obtain the authorisation code for verification. 
E) The authorisation server authenticates the client, validates the         
authorisation code, and ensures that the redirection URI received 
matches the URI used to redirect the client in step C). If valid, the 
authorisation server responds back with an access token and, 
optionally, a refresh token. 
6.3.3  Implicit 
The implicit grant is a simplified authorisation code flow optimized for clients 
implemented in a browser using a scripting language such as JavaScript. In the 
implicit flow, instead of issuing the client an authorisation code, the client is issued an 
access token directly (as the result of the resource owner authorisation). The grant 
type is implicit, as no intermediate credentials (such as an authorisation code) are 
issued (and later used to obtain an access token).  
When issuing an access token during the implicit grant flow, the    authorisation 
server does not authenticate the client. In some cases, the client identity can be 
verified via the redirection URI used to deliver the access token to the client. The 
access token may be exposed to the resource owner or other applications with 
access to the resource owner's user-agent.  
Implicit grants improve the responsiveness and efficiency of some clients (such as a 
client implemented as an in-browser application), since it reduces the number of 
round trips required to obtain an access token. However, this convenience should be 
weighed against the security implications of using implicit grants, especially when the 
authorisation code grant type is available.  
6.3.4  Resource Owner Password Credentials 
The resource owner password credentials (i.e., username and password)    can be 
used directly as an authorisation grant to obtain an access token. The credentials 
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should only be used when there is a high degree of trust between the resource owner 
and the client (e.g., the client is part of the device operating system or a highly 
privileged application), and when other authorisation grant types are not    available 
(such as an authorisation code). 
Even though this grant type requires direct client access to the resource owner 
credentials, the resource owner credentials are used for a single request and are 
exchanged for an access token. This grant type can eliminate the need for the client 
to store the resource owner credentials for future use, by exchanging the    
credentials with a long-lived access token or refresh token. 
6.3.5  Client Credentials 
The client credentials (or other forms of client authentication) can be used as an 
authorisation grant when the authorisation scope is limited to the protected resources 
under the control of the client, or to protected resources previously arranged with the 
authorisation server. Client credentials are used as an authorisation grant typically 
when the client is acting on its own behalf (the client is    also the resource owner) or 
is requesting access to protected resources based on an authorisation previously 
arranged with the authorisation server. 
6.4  Access Token 
Access tokens are credentials used to access protected resources. An access token 
is a string representing an authorisation issued to the client. The string is usually 
opaque to the client. Tokens represent specific scopes and durations of access, 
granted by the resource owner, and enforced by the resource server and 
authorisation server. 
The token may denote an identifier used to retrieve the authorisation    information or 
may self-contain the authorisation information in a verifiable manner (i.e., a token 
string consisting of some data and a signature). Additional authentication credentials, 
which are beyond the scope of this specification, may be required in order for the 
client to use a token. 
The access token provides an abstraction layer, replacing different    authorisation 
constructs (e.g., username and password) with a single token understood by the 
resource server. This abstraction enables issuing access tokens more restrictive than 
the authorisation grant used to obtain them, as well as removing the resource 
server's need to understand a wide range of authentication methods. 
Access tokens can have different formats, structures, and methods of utilization (e.g., 
cryptographic properties) based on the resource server security requirements. 
6.5  Refresh Token 
Refresh tokens are credentials used to obtain access tokens. Refresh tokens are 
issued to the client by the authorisation server and are used to obtain a new access 
token when the current access token becomes invalid or expires, or to obtain 
additional access tokens with identical or narrower scope (access tokens may have a 
shorter lifetime and fewer permissions than authorized by the resource owner).  
Issuing a refresh token is optional at the discretion of the authorisation server. If the 
authorisation server issues a refresh token, it is included when issuing an access 
token (i.e., step (D) in Figure 2). 
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A refresh token is a string representing the authorisation granted to the client by the 
resource owner. The string is usually opaque to the client. The token denotes an 
identifier used to retrieve the authorisation information. Unlike access tokens, refresh 
tokens are intended for use only with authorisation servers and are never sent to 
resource servers. 
Figure 4. Refreshing an Expired Access Token. 
 
The flow illustrated in Figure 4 includes the following steps: 
A) The client requests an access token by authenticating with the         
authorisation server and presenting an authorisation grant. 
B) The authorisation server authenticates the client and validates the 
authorisation grant, and if valid, issues an access token and a refresh 
token. 
C) The client makes a protected resource request to the resource         
server by presenting the access token. 
D) The resource server validates the access token, and if valid, serves the 
request. 
E) Steps C) and D) repeat until the access token expires. If the client 
knows the access token expired, it skips to step G); otherwise, it makes 
another protected resource request. 
F) Since the access token is invalid, the resource server returns an invalid 
token error. 
G) The client requests a new access token by authenticating with the 
authorisation server and presenting the refresh token. The client 
authentication requirements are based on the client type and on the 
authorisation server policies. 
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H) The authorisation server authenticates the client and validates the 
refresh token, and if valid, issues a new access token (and, optionally, a 
new refresh token). 
6.6  TLS Version 
Whenever Transport Layer Security (TLS) is used by this specification, the 
appropriate version (or versions) of TLS will vary over time, based on the widespread 
deployment and known security vulnerabilities. 
Implementations MAY also support additional transport-layer security    mechanisms 
that meet their security requirements. 
6.7  HTTP Redirections 
This specification makes extensive use of HTTP redirections, in which the client or 
the authorisation server directs the resource owner's user-agent to another 
destination. While the examples in this specification show the use of the HTTP 302 
status code, any other method available via the user-agent to accomplish this 
redirection is allowed and is considered to be an implementation detail. 
6.8  Interoperability 
OAuth 2.0 provides a rich authorisation framework with well-defined security 
properties. However, as a rich and highly extensible framework with many optional 
components, on its own, this specification is likely to produce a wide range of non-
interoperable implementations. 
In addition, this specification leaves a few required components partially or fully 
undefined (e.g., client registration, authorisation server capabilities, endpoint 
discovery). Without these components, clients must be manually and specifically    
configured against a specific authorisation server and resource server in order to 
interoperate. 
This framework was designed with the clear expectation that future work will define 
prescriptive profiles and extensions necessary to achieve full web-scale 
interoperability. 
6.9   Security considerations 
For the security considerations, we refer the reader to the RFC 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6819, which describes the security framework of OAuth 
2.0. 
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We studied OAuth [12] in addition to the framework recommendations RFC2818 
[4], RFC5849 [5] because in [12] the details how the OAuth framework achieves 
high standards in terms of security are more detailed and illustrated. OAuth 
security specification is considered to OpenIoT implementation providing a good 
starting point for a scalable security implementation.  The OAuth security guide 
[12] is written by the lead author of the RFC2818, RFC5849 therefore, we 
consider the documents as complementary and necessary in order to obtain the 
whole picture of the OAuth framework, from the first hand, that is very 
important not only for developers of OpenIoT but also for general audience to 
demonstrate that OAuth is based on proven security mechanisms and protocols 
as it is cited in this project deliverable. 
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7 TRUSTWORTHINESS OF SENSOR READINGS 
In this section we describe an approach for trust-management in an IoT 
environment, specifically targeting sensor data readings. When sensor data is 
acquired from large and heterogeneous crowds, the trustworthiness of each 
sensor reading can be compromised, consequently lowering the overall utility of 
the system. In this context, it is important for an IoT platform to be able to assess 
how much a sensor data observation can be trusted.  
The main outcome of this work is an algorithm that precisely provides an 
assessment of sensor data trustworthiness, based on the principle of comparing 
data produced by similar (sometimes overlapping or redundant) sensors. Spatial 
correlation has a meaning in the context of sensor data in a variety of monitoring 
applications, where a key characteristic is that nearby sensor nodes monitoring 
an environmental feature typically register similar values [9, 10]. This kind of data 
redundancy due to the spatial correlation between sensor observations is the 
corner-stone of the proposed algorithm for assessing trustworthiness of sensor 
readings. Thus, we use the spatial neighbourhood of a given sensor to compare 
its values with values of the neighbourhood to assess trustworthiness of the 
sensor.  
The most related to our work is [7, 8], where a provenance and a game-theoretic 
approach for assessing trustworthiness in sensor networks were proposed. 
However, they did not consider spatio-temporal correlations between the sensor 
streams. In [11] a multi-stream join was proposed for mining spatio-temporal 
correlations between multiple streams.  
7.1   Notation 
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7.2  Problem definition 
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The problem of computing trustworthiness of sensors readings based on spatio-
temporal correlation with neighbours can be defined as follows: 
Given: 
– an input collection of spatio-temporally correlated (temporary overlapping 
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– t(i)s and t(i)e are the start and end timestamp of sensor stream s(i) respectively. 
– sensor identifier k. 
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7.3   Overview of the method 








 in Figure 5, and the task of assessing 




 based on its spatio-
temporal correlation with neighbouring streams. Thus, the general idea of our 
approach, to computing a trust stream for a given sensor node, is to compare its 
values with values of its neighbouring sensors. Then the more the streams of the 
neighbours are similar the higher the trust of the sensor. Note the neighbouring 
streams may not completely cover the time span of s
(1)
 (presence of 
discontinuities) that makes the problem more difficult than simply correlating 
streams.  
Thus, our method works as follows: (I) we assess the spatio-temporal correlations 
between the streams to form the neighbourhood for each sensor in a time period 
where we assume all streams are trustworthy and (II) given the  neighbourhood 
we assess the trustworthiness of the sensors by comparing them to the centroids 
of the neighbourhood. 
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Figure 5. Trust of Sensor Stream Representations. 
7.4  Algorithm 
We associate a trust score with each data point that provides an indication about 
trustworthiness of the data point. The more trustworthy data a source provides 
the more trusted is the source. Thus, there is an interdependence between trust  
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scores of data points and its sensor and vice-versa. Trust scores of data points 
are computed by taking into account data point values generated from sensor in a 
given neighbourhood of the given sensor. We use value similarity: the more data 
points referring to the same real-world event (neighbours) have similar values the 
higher the trust score of the data point. Trust score need to be continuously 
evaluated in the stream environment. 
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 Then the can be expressed as the p-value 
. 
Clearly, the trust values have the probability correspondence and are values in 
the interval [0, 1]. 
 
7.5  Trust-Module architecture for IoT  
In this section we present a proposal of architecture of a Trust-Module that 
accommodates the specifics/requirements of an IoT environment such as 
OpenIoT. Thus, given the fact that sensor streams in OpenIoT are by default 
stored in the cloud database (LSM) for further processing, implies the following 
architecture of the trust module: 
 Trust-Module is an independent module in OpenIoT. 
 It obtains the sensor streams from LSM and outputs corresponding trust 
streams back to LSM. 
There are the following ways of computing the trust stream given available sensor 
streams in LSM: 
 On-line (immediate) while storing the sensor streams to LSM. The 
disadvantage of this approach is a heavy overloading of the capabilities of 
the trust module, LSM and the communication link between them.  
 Off-line on demand: computed if the corresponding query arrives. This 
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approach has the same disadvantage as the on-line approach, where in 
this case it is a blocking operation. The advantage of this approach is that 
LSM will not be populated with trust streams that may never be used. 
 Off-line periodically (deferred): computed periodically after the sensor 
streams have been stored in LSM. 
We adopt the off-line solution combined with caching mechanism to optimize the 
computational and storage resources. 
Figure 6 presents the view on the integration of the trust module in the OpenIoT 
architecture. Clearly, the follow of data is as follows:  
 X-GSN provides sensor streams to LSM. 
 The Trust-Module obtains the data from LSM and periodically outputs the 
corresponding trust streams back to LSM (stored in a separate entity that 
references the corresponding sensor stream). 
 Trust-Module communicates with SCH and SDUM to process queries. In 
particular, SCH may trigger an on-demand computation of a trust stream if 
this is necessary for a given query (e.g., the query specifies a minimum 
trust threshold for sensor data), while SDUM will monitor the performance 
of TM and trigger periodic computation of trust streams. 
 
 
Figure 6. Trust-Module in OpenIoT. 
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8 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY FRAMEWORK 
In this section we give an overview of the currently implemented prototype of the 
security framework, including the OpenIoT CAS server, Security Client and 
Security management console. The documentation for how to use and configure 
the prototype can be found on the OpenIoT wiki2.  
We have adapted Jasig CAS3 for authentication and authorisation. CAS is an 
open source multi-protocol Single Sign-On (SSO) solution with a lot of flexibility in 
configuration. Particularly, it can integrate with several authentication methods 
such as Active Directory, JAAS, JDBC, LDAP, and so on. It can achieve high 
availability by providing support for storing client authentication state in distributed 
storage providers such as BerkleyDB, Ehcache, JDBC, Memcache, and so on. 
CAS can be configured to act as an OAuth2.0 server. Another OAuth provider and 
client library is Spring Security OAuth. However, we have opted for using CAS 
using OAuth wrapper because of its configuration flexibility and the ease of 
integration. We refer to the OpenIoT adaptation of CAS interchangeably, by 
Security Server or OpenIoT CAS. 
8.1  General Authentication and Authorisation Approach 
In this section we describe, using OpenIoT CAS, how different components of 
OpenIoT interact securely and how they implement access control. The OpenIoT 
security module consists of three modules, namely, Security Server, Management 
Console, and Security Client. In the following, we first present the overall 
authentication and authorisation approach and then each module is explained in 
details. 
In the context of security module, we use the term service (as it is used by CAS) 
to refer to any component that uses the OpenIoT security module for 
authentication and authorisation. For example, LSM-light.server, SD&UM, 
Scheduler, and X-GSN are considered services. In OAuth2.0 protocol, the 
components that request authorisation are called clients. Therefore, the terms 
service and client are used interchangeably.  
Each OpenIoT component and application must identify itself to the security 
server to be recognized as a service or client. For this purpose, the security 
management module provides a user interface for registering and managing 
services. Each service is assigned a key (or clientId) and secret which are 
considered as the credentials of the service. We distinguish between two different 
service types: web application services and REST services. Web application 
services (hereafter, simply referred to as services) are the applications that 
directly interact with users through a web interface. For example, Request 
Definition and Request Presentation web applications are considered as web 
application services. The applications that do not interact with users through a 
web interface and users cannot log into them from their browsers are called 
REST services. For example, Scheduler, SD&UM, and LSM-Server are 
considered as REST services. 
                                            
2 https://github.com/OpenIotOrg/openiot/wiki/Documentation 
3 http://www.jasig.org/cas/ 
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8.1.1  Authentication 
In OpenIoT, user management is done centrally by the Security module. 
Furthermore, user authentication is the responsibility of the security server. In this 
way, each application does not have to individually deal with user management 
and authentication. In a web application, user authentication steps are the 
following: 
1. User opens the application in her browser. For being able to access the 
features of the application, the user has to log in. The application, that is 
integrated the OpenIoT security mechanism, provides a “log in” link for the 
user. Figure 7 shows the first of the security management console 




Figure 7. Home page of management console application with “Log In” link 
2. The user clicked on “Log in” link. The server redirects the user’s browser to 
the OpenIoT CAS login page as shown in Figure 8.  
3. The user enters her OpenIoT username and password and clicks “LOGIN”. 
If login is successful, the user is asked to authorize the application to 
access her profile, including her permission information. Figure 9 shows 
the authorisation page for user “admin”. 
4. If the user clicks on “Allow”, she will be redirected back to the application 
(Figure 10). In the process, the security server generates and returns a 
token to the web application. This token represents an authenticated user 
and is used in all the interactions between the web application and the 
security server or other OpenIoT components. 
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Figure 8. OpenIoT CAS login page 
 
 
Figure 9. OpenIoT CAS authorisation page 
 
 
Figure 10. Home page of management console application after user is 
authenticated 
8.1.2  Authorisation 
After the user is authenticated, it is the responsibility of the application to protect 
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the critical resources and parts of the interface by applying an access control 
mechanism. The OpenIoT security module provides a unified and flexible 
permission control approach to facilitate access control. Each OpenIoT module 
or application defines its own set of permissions. Permissions can be selectively 
assigned to users. The application developer protects critical parts of code by 
putting permission controls before each critical part. If the user, represented by a 
token, does not have the required permissions, she cannot use the functionality 
or the resources that require those permissions.  
 
 
Figure 11. Sequence diagram of a sample access control 
Figure 11 represents the sequence diagram of authorisation control performed by 
the Request Definition and Scheduler modules for two user actions. In this 
example, Request Definition is a web application service that is supposed to be 
already registered in the Security Service with clientId of “clid_RDUI”. Scheduler 
is a REST service that is supposed to be registered in the Security Server with 
clientId of “clid_SCH”. For improving security, in OpenIoT, we require all REST 
services to be authenticated in OpenIoT CAS and receive a token. In this 
example, we assume that Scheduler is logged in CAS and has received the token 
“SCH_tkn”. The first step for the user, with user ID of “u_id”, is to be authenticated 
as described in the previous subsection. The user token that is given to the 
Request Definition UI application (RDUI) is referred to as “u_tkn”. The following 
steps are performed to retrieve registered user applications after user 
authentication. 
1. First, RDUI checks whether the user has the permission to use the 
application. This permission is represented by the permission string 
“use_RDUI”. For this aim, RDUI calls the hasPermission method of the 
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AuthorizationManager class, giving its clientID, the user token and the 
permission string. In this example, AuthorizationManager represents the 
Security Client utility.  
2. The AuthorizationManager sends a request to the security server asking 
for permissions of the user. The request is accompanied by the user token 
and clientId of RDUI. 
3. The security server verifies the validity of the token. If the token is valid 
(e.g., not expired), it returns the permission list of the user. 
4. If the permission “use_RDUI” is among the permission list, the user is 
allowed to use the application. In the next step RDUI retrieves the 
registered applications of the user. 
5. RDUI send a request to the Scheduler to retrieve the applications of the 
user, sending userId, user token, and its clientId.  
6. Scheduler calls the hasPermission method of the AuthorizationManager 
class, giving its clientID, token, the user token, and the permission string of 
“get_apps”. 
7. The AuthorizationManager sends a request to the security server asking 
for permissions of the user on the Scheduler service. The request is 
accompanied by the user token, the Sheduler token and clientId, and the 
clientId of RDUI (the initiator of the call). 
8. The security server verifies the validity of the tokens. If the tokens are valid 
(e.g., not expired), it returns the permission list of the user on the 
Scheduler service. 
9. If the permission “get_apps” is among the permissions of the user, 
Scheduler retrieves the applications from the LSM Server. 
10. In the next step, the user wishes to register her newly created application. 
RDUI checks for permission “define_service”. Since the 
AuthorizationManager has already retrieved and cached the permissions 
of the user for RDUI, it checks the permission locally. The user application 
is registered only when she has the permission “define_service”. 
8.2  OpenIot CAS 
We have adapted OAuth2.0 enabled CAS server (version 3.5.2) for authentication 
and authorisation in the security-server module. It has been configured to store 
data in the LSM-Light server. 
In order to modify the configuration of the original CAS library, we use Maven2 
war overlay method. This means that the files that we modify will replace the 
corresponding files in the standard CAS server war. 
The security-server module depends on utils.commons and lsm-light.client 
components. Therefore, it is mandatory to install these components before trying 
to deploy the security-server module. 
8.2.1  Configuration 
The security module is deployed in JBoss and requires the SSL to be activated. 
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We assume that JBoss AS7 is used in standalone mode. By $jboss-home we 
refer to the JBoss AS7 directory. 
8.2.2  JBoss Configuration 
Assume that you store the required SSL files in a path YOUR_SSL_DIR_PATH 
(e.g., $jboss-home/standalone/configuration/ssl). 
1. If the directory structure does not exist, run mkdir -p 
YOUR_SSL_DIR_PATH 
2. Run cd YOUR_SSL_DIR_PATH 
3. Run keytool -genkey -alias jbosskey -keypass <password> 
-keyalg RSA -keystore server.keystore Use "localhost" as 
Common Name [as answer to "What is your first and last name?"]. If you 
are deploying on a server, use the DNS name of the server instead of 
"localhost". 
4. Run keytool -export -alias jbosskey -keypass <password> 
-file server.crt -keystore server.keystore 
5. Run keytool -import -alias jbosscert -keypass 
<password> -file server.crt -keystore server.keystore 
Ignore the warning! 
6. In $jboss-home/standalone/configuration/standalone.xml add the following 







7. Next, you'll have to import this certificate into the java trust-store with the 
command keytool -import -keystore 
$JAVA_HOME/jre/lib/security/cacerts -file server.cert -
alias incommon. In Linux you will have to do this as root. 
8. Restart JBoss and go to https://localhost:8443 to see if SSL is enabled and 
works correctly. 
8.2.2.1 OpenIOT CAS Configuration 
Configuration parameters for the security server module can be found in the 
OpenIoT global properties file (openiot.properties). The relevant properties are 
the following: 
 security.lsm.sparql.endpoint: the LSM SPARQL endpoint 
 security.lsm.graphURL: the graph in which data will be stored 
 server.name: the server address on which the OpenIoT CAS is deployed 
<connector name="https" protocol="HTTP/1.1" scheme="https" socket-
binding="https" secure="true"> 
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 The lifetime of tickets can be configured by two properties: 1) 
tgt.maxTimeToLiveInSeconds that specifies the maximum time to live of 
the ticket. After this amount of time, the ticket will expire no matter how 
many times it has been accessed; 2) tgt.timeToKillInSeconds that 
determines the the maximum time during which the ticket can remain idle. 
If no accesses occur after this period, the ticket will expire. 
 Parameters for exporting initial data into LSM: when the OpenIoT CAS 
server is deployed for the first time, if its data graph is empty, by default 
some bootstrapping data will be stored in the graph. This data includes the 
administrator user information and its default roles and permissions, as 
well as the default services. The relevant properties are the following:         
o security.automaticServiceSetup: indicates whether or not the 
bootstrapping should be done if the data graph is empty. The default 
value is true. 
o security.initialize.admin.username: username of the admin user. The 
default value is admin. 
o security.initialize.admin.password: password of the admin user. The 
default value is secret. 
o security.initialize.admin.email: email of the admin user. The default 
value is admin@openiot.eu. 
o security.initialize.lsmserver.username: default username for LSM-
light.server. The same property exists for scheduler and sdum 
modules. 
o security.initialize.lsmserver.password: default password for LSM-
light.server. The same property exists for scheduler and sdum 
modules. 
o security.initialize.cas.prefix: the prefix for the CAS service. If you are 
not deploying on localhost, change the address (or port). 
o security.initialize.management.prefix: the prefix for the security 
management console service. If you are not deploying on localhost, 
change the address (or port). 
o security.initialize.management.key: the key for the security 
management console service. 
o security.initialize.management.secret: the secret for the security 
management console service. 
o security.demoWebappServices: the list of web application services 
that are created for each demo user (if enabled by setting 
security.automaticServiceSetup to true) upon signing up. 
o security.demoServices: the list of all demo services that are enabled 
for demo users if this feature is activated as mentioned above. 
The following services are created in the bootstrapping step: 
 ServiceManager: This service is required for service management in 
CAS. The hostname and port in the serviceId column can be changed if 
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required. 
 HTTP: This service is required for OAuth2.0 support in CAS. The 
hostname and port in the serviceId column can be changed if required. 
 lsm-server: This service is defined for the LSM Server. 
 openiot-security-manager-app: This service corresponds to the 
management console of the security&privacy module. We will explain how 
to manage these services later in this documentation. 
8.2.3  Deployment 
For deploying the OpenIoT CAS server war in JBoss, go to security-server 
module directory and run mvn jboss-as:deploy. If the deployment is 
successful, you must be able to see a web application called openiot-cas 
deployed in JBoss. Go to https://localhost:8443/openiot-cas and log in using the 
default admin credentials specified in openiot.properties file to verify the 
deployment. 
8.2.4  Managing Services in OpenIoT CAS 
Each application has to be registered in OpenIoT CAS as a service in order to be 
recognized for authentication and authorisation. The OpenIoT security 
management console provides a web interface for registering new services and 
managing the existing ones. 
8.3  Security Management Console 
The OpenIoT Security and Privacy module comes with a management console 
for managing services, users, and permissions.  
8.3.1  Configuration 
By default, it is assumed that the management console will be deployed in a local 
JBoss instance and is accessible on http://localhost:8080/security.management/. 
If this is not the case in your setting, you must adapt the clients.callbackUrl 
property in web-client.ini file, which is located in security-
management/src/main/resources directory. Note that the recommended 
way to modify configuration parameters is to copy the web-client.ini to 
$jboss.config.dir/web-client-security.management.ini and 
modify the desired values there. 
Likewise, it is assumed that the OpenIoT CAS is deployed locally and is 
accessible on https://localhost:8443/openiot-cas. If this does not correspond to 
your setting, update casOauthClient.casOAuthUrl and 
clientsRealm.permissionsURL properties in the ini configuration file. 
Finally, it is recommended that you change the default secret that is used for 
openiot-security-manager-app (in the ini configuration file and/or in the global 
openiot.properties file). 
The location of log file and other logging configuration, such as logging levels, 
can be modified in security-
management/src/main/resources/logback.xml. By default, the 
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configured log file is $jboss-home/standalone/log/security-
management.log. 
8.3.2  Deployment 
For using the management console, security-server module must be deployed. 
Instructions for deploying the security-server module are provided in Section 8.2 . 
This web application is registered in the OpenIoT CAS by the name of “openiot-
security-manager-app”. 
You can deploy the security console web application by running mvn jboss-
as:deploy in security-management module directory. After successful 
deployment, go to http://localhost:8080/security.management/ for using security 
module management console. Log in with username “admin”, and password 
“secret” (the default credentials of the admin user). This user has all the 
necessary permissions to manage users and permissions for all registered 
services. Figure 10 shows the first page of the management console application 
after successful login. 
8.3.3  Use 
The management console provides the following functionality: 
 Defining/managing permissions for registered services 
 Defining/managing roles for registered services 
 Assigning roles to users or revoking roles from users 
 Adding/managing services 
 Registering/managing users 
Role is a container for one or more permissions. Permissions cannot be directly 
assigned to users. Instead, they must be assigned to a role. Then the role is 
granted to the users. Roles and permissions are defined per service. This means 
that for each service, we have to define its own set of permissions and roles. We 
use Apache Shiro's4 wildcard permission syntax to define the permissions. We 
briefly describe the syntax in the following. Please refer to the official 
documentation5 for detailed information about wildcard permissions. 
A wildcard permission, in the simplest case, is a string permission like 
“register_service” or “use_app”. In this case, the developer checks whether or not 
the user has the exact permission specified by the permission string. The 
wildcard permission “*”, which means all permissions, can be assigned to users. 
This special permission string represents all possible permission strings. Wildcard 
permissions can contain multiple levels. Each level is separated by a “:”. For 
example, the permission string “use_app:part_n” has two levels: “use_app” and 
“part_n”. The number of levels is unlimited and the semantic of levels is defined 
by the permission designer. The wildcard character can be used in any level. For 
example a user with permission “use_app:*” has any permission like “use_app:X”, 
where “X” can be any permission string. Last but not least, each level can contain 
                                            
4 http://shiro.apache.org 
5 http://shiro.apache.org/permissions.html 
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multiple permissions. For example, assigning the permission “use_app:part1, 
part2” to a user is equivalent to assigning her “use_app:part1” and 
“use_app:part2” permissions. 
8.3.3.1 Managing Services 
In the “Manage services” section of the management console, users can view 
registered services, edit, or remove them. New web application services and rest 
services can also be defined in this section. Figure 12 shows an screenshot of 
the “Manage services” section. 
 
Figure 12. Managing services in management console application 
To add a new web application service, click on the “New Service” button and 
specify the following fields as shown in Figure 13. 
 In the Key field enter the clientId of the service. 
 In the Secret field enter the secret of the service. 
 In the URL field enter the callback URL of the service. For example, in 
case of management console service deployed on localhost, we enter 
http://localhost:8080/security.management/callback?client_name=CasOAut
hWrapperClient. This URL consists of the application path and the 
mandatory /callback?client_name=CasOAuthWrapperClient part. 
 In the Display name field enter the name of the service that is displayed to 
the user in the authorisation confirmation page while logging in any web 
application that uses the OpenIoT CAS for authentication and 
authorisation. For example, in case of the management console, the 
default display name is "Manager". 
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Figure 13. Adding/editing web application services 
To add a new REST service, click on the “New REST Service” button and specify 
the following fields as shown in Figure 14. 
 In the Key field enter the clientId of the service. 
 In the Secret field enter the secret of the service. 
 
 
Figure 14. Adding/editing REST services 
8.3.3.2 Managing Permissions 
In the “Manage permissions” section of the management console application, 
users can manage permissions for registered services. In the first step, the user 
must select a service to manage its permissions as shown in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15. Permission management section of management console 
After selecting the service, the list of permissions defined for the service is shown. 
By selecting permission, the list of roles that contain the selected permission is 
populated. In addition, the list of users who have the selected permission is 
updated. The selected permission can be deleted given that the user has the 
permission “admin:delete_permission:openiot-security-manager-app”. Figure 16 
show a snapshot of the application, when the “lsm-server” service is selected for 
managing its permissions. 
 
 
Figure 16. The list of permissions defined for the "lsm-server" service 
Users can define new permissions for the selected service, provided that they 
have the permission “admin:create_permission:openiot-security-manager-app”. 
As shown in Figure 17, a new permission is defined by its name. The description 
of the permission helps to document the purpose of the permission. 
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Figure 17. Adding new permission for the selected service 
8.3.3.3 Managing Roles 
In the “Manage roles” section of the management console application, users can 
manage roles for registered services. In the first step, the user must select a 
service to manage its roles. As shown in Figure 18, after selecting a service, its 
defined roles are shown. By selection a role, the permissions assigned to it are 
displayed in the right pane. The list of users who are granted the selected role is 
also shown. In this page, new permissions can be assigned to the selected role; 
the role can be granted to more users; the role can be revoked from users; and 
permissions can be revoked from the role. The selected role can be deleted given 
that the user has the permission “admin:delete_role:openiot-security-manager-
app”. 
 
Figure 18. Role management in management console application 
Users can define new roles for the selected service, provided that they have the 
permission “admin:create_role:openiot-security-manager-app”. A new role is 
defined by its name. The description of the permission helps to document the 
purpose of the permission. 
8.3.3.4 User Management 
In the “Manage users” section of the management console application, users can 
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see the registered users and their granted roles for registered services. As shown 
in Figure 19Figure 18, after selecting a user and a service, her granted roles are 
shown. By selection a role, the permissions assigned to it are displayed in the 
right pane. New roles can be granted to the selected user and roles can be 
revoked from the selected user. The selected user can be deleted given that the 
logged in user has the permission “admin:delete_user”. 
 
 
Figure 19. User management in management console application 
8.3.3.5 User Registration 
A new user can sign up using the management console application (Figure 20). If 
the security.automaticServiceSetup property is set to true in the 
openiot.properties file, then the user can enter a Service URL Prefix so that the 
required services are generated for her standard OpenIoT web application 
modules which are deployed locally. The list of these modules must be defined in 
the openiot.properties file using the property security.demoWebappServices. The 
format is like [webapp1 name, key1, secret1, display name][webapp2 name, 
key2, secret2, display name], etc. If the property security.signup.useCaptcha is 
set to true, a captcha field is added to the signup form. 
8.3.3.6 Demo Services 
If the property security.automaticServiceSetup is set to true in the 
openiot.properties file, users can see the list of the services that are configured 
for demo usage in the “Guest services” section. The property 
security.demoServices indicates the services that are accessible as demo 
services separated by a comma. For REST services the service key should be 
put in this comma separated list. For web application service the name of the 
webapp must be placed in the list. 
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Figure 20. User registration page 
8.3.3.7 Management Console Permissions 
For using the security management console application, users need to have the 
permission “admin:user_mgmt_general”. This means that without this permission 
the user doesn't have access to the functionality of the security management 
application. The list of other service-specific permissions is provided in Table 5. 
Name Description 
admin:delete_role:SERVICE_NAME Permission for deleting roles for service 
'SERVICE_NAME' 
admin:create_role:SERVICE_NAME Permission for creating new roles for 
service 'SERVICE_NAME' 
admin:grant_role:SERVICE_NAME Permission for granting/revoking roles to 
users for service 'SERVICE_NAME' 
admin:create_permission:SERVICE_NAME Permission for creating new permissions 
for service 'SERVICE_NAME' 
admin:delete_permission:SERVICE_NAME Permission for deleting permissions for 
service 'SERVICE_NAME' 
admin:user_mgmt:SERVICE_NAME User management permission for 
service 'SERVICE_NAME' 
Table 5. Permissions for working with the management console application 
For example, if you want to grant all permissions to the user openiotuser to 
manage roles and permissions for the service openiot-security-manager-app, you 
can create a role named “user-manager” in service openiot-security-manager-app 
and add the above permissions to this role. Then assign this role to openiotuser. 
Note that in this case, in the above permissions, SERVICE_NAME must be 
replaced by openiot-security-manager-app.  
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8.4  Security Client 
The Security Client module provides utilities to facilitate authentication and 
authorisation in other OpenIoT components and applications. The OpenIoT 
security client can be used in web applications that provide a user interface and 
interact directly with users. It can also be used in intermediate service providers 
that interact with other components through WebServices or REST calls. In order 
to be able to use this module for authentication and access control, some specific 
configurations must be done in in the modules. The OpenIoT security 
management console uses the security client module for authentication and 
authorisation. It is a good example of how to use this module in new OpenIoT 
applications. 
8.4.1  Deployment 
In order to use the security client in the modules that are built using maven, it 
must be built and installed in the local maven repository. For building and 
installing the security module, go to the security-client module directory and run 
mvn install. The security client depends on the utils.commons module. 
Therefore, it must be installed in the local maven repository before building and 
installing the security module. 
8.4.2  Maven Dependencies 
The first step in using the security client is to add the following dependency to the 
pom file of the module: 
 
 
The default client library that we use for authentication & authorisation using 
OpenIoT CAS is Apache Shiro. This library is provided as a dependency in the 
security module. Therefore, it is not necessary to explicitly add it as a 
dependency in the pom files. 
8.4.3  Usage for Web Applications 
The security client can be used in web applications that provide log in for users 
and implement access control. 
8.4.3.1 Shiro Webapp Configuration 




    <groupId>org.openiot</groupId> 
    <artifactId>security.client</artifactId> 
    <version>0.0.1-SNAPSHOT</version> 
</dependency> 
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Note that in web.xml all other configuration places, MODULE_NAME should be 
replaced by the actual name you give to your module. For configuring Shiro, we 
can create a file named web-client.ini with the following example contents (taken 
from the security management console module) and place it into the classpath 
(e.g. in WEB-INF directory). However, the recommended approach is to create a 
configuration file named web-client-MODULE_NAME.ini in the JBoss 
configuration folder. In fact, if this file is not found, the security client will try to find 
a web-client.ini file in the classpath of your module. 
<context-param> 
    <param-name>shiroEnvironmentClass</param-name> 




    <param-name>module-name</param-name> 
    <param-value>MODULE_NAME</param-value> 
</context-param> 
<filter> 
    <filter-name>ShiroFilter</filter-name> 
    <filter-class>org.apache.shiro.web.servlet.ShiroFilter</filter-class> 
</filter> 
<filter-mapping> 
    <filter-name>ShiroFilter</filter-name> 
    <url-pattern>/*</url-pattern> 
    <dispatcher>REQUEST</dispatcher>  
    <dispatcher>FORWARD</dispatcher>  
    <dispatcher>INCLUDE</dispatcher>  
    <dispatcher>ERROR</dispatcher> 
</filter-mapping> 
<listener> 
    <listener-
class>org.apache.shiro.web.env.EnvironmentLoaderListener</listener-class> 
</listener> 
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The most important properties in this configuration file are the following: 
 casOauthClient.casOAuthUrl property specifies the address of the 






# Sets the callbackUrl for each client in the list 
clients = org.pac4j.core.client.Clients 
clients.callbackUrl = http://localhost:8080/security.management/callback 
clients.clientsList = $casOauthClient 
clientsFilter = org.openiot.security.client.CasOAuthClientFilter 
clientsFilter.clients = $clients 
clientsFilter.failureUrl = /error.xhtml 
casOauthRoles = io.buji.pac4j.filter.ClientRolesAuthorizationFilter 
casOauthRoles.client = $casOauthClient 
casOauthUsers = io.buji.pac4j.filter.ClientUserFilter 
casOauthUsers.client = $casOauthClient 
clientsRealm = org.openiot.security.client.CasOAuthClientRealm 
clientsRealm.permissionsURL=https://localhost:8443/openiot-
cas/oauth2.0/permissions 
clientsRealm.defaultRoles = ROLE_USER 
clientsRealm.clients = $clients 
sessionManager = org.apache.shiro.web.session.mgt.DefaultWebSessionManager 
sessionManager.globalSessionTimeout=1800000 
securityManager.sessionManager = $sessionManager 
[urls] 
# NOTE: Order matters! The first match wins. 
/logout = logout 
/callback = clientsFilter 
/signup.xhtml = anon 
/error.xhtml = anon 
/index.* = anon 
/index = anon 
/home.* = anon 
/home = anon 
/javax.faces.*/** = anon 
/?*/** = casOauthRoles[ROLE_USER] 
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address refers to the OpenIoT CAS server. If the OpenIoT CAS is 
deployed in a different place, this URL must be updated accordingly. 
 casOauthClient.key designates the clientID of the web client, and 
casOauthClient.secret specifies its secret. If you specify the properties 
casOauthClient.MODULE_NAME.key and 
casOauthClient.MODULE_NAME.secret in the global openiot.properties 
file, you can skip providing casOauthClient.key and casOauthClient.secret 
in the ini file; because they will be overridden by the values from the 
openiot.properties file. 
 clients.callbackUrl is the URL that is called back by the CAS server. It 
consists of the URL of your application followed by /callback. 
 clientsRealm.permissionsURL is the URL on the OAuth provider for 
retrieving permissions of the authenticated user. If the OpenIoT CAS is 
deployed in a different place, this URL must be updated accordingly. 
 sessionManager is responsible for managing user sessions and must be 
set according to the above example ini configuration file.  
In the [urls] section, we can define protection rules using URL patterns. In the 
sample configuration file, /signup.xhtml, /index.*, /javax.faces.*/**, 
and /home.* are configured to be accessible to users without requiring them to 
log in. /?*/** = casOauthRoles[ROLE_USER] signifies that all other 
resources are protected and are accessible only to authenticated users. If the 
user has not been logged in yet, she will be redirected to the OpenIoT CAS login 
page. /logout = logout and /callback = clientsFilter must be left as they 
are to provide logout capability and OAuth authentication. For more information 
on configuring Shiro please refer to its official documents6. 
8.4.3.2 Manual Redirection 
Using access control rules in the [urls] section of the Shiro configuration file is 
the easiest way to handle access to different resources of the web application. 
However, this can also be performed manually, for example in a Servlet. The 
following code snippet in a servlet checks whether or not the user has already 
been authenticated. If not, it redirects the user to the login page (in our case, it 
redirects the user to the login page on the OpenIoT CAS). 
 






Subject subject = SecurityUtils.getSubject(); 
    if (!subject.isAuthenticated()) 
        AccessControlUtil.getInstance().redirectToLogin(req, resp); 
D5.2.2 Privacy and Security Framework b 
Copyright  2014 OpenIoT Consortium  64 
8.4.3.3 Checking for Permissions and Roles 
Having made sure that the user has been authenticated, it is straightforward to 
check if the user has a role or permission for the given service (e.g., current web 
application) using the 
org.openiot.security.client.AccessControlUtil utility class: 
1. hasPermission(String perm): checks whether or not the user has the given 
permission 
2. hasRole(String role): checks whether or not the user has the given role 
In order to use the utility methods provided by AccessControlUtil, first we 
need to obtain a reference to its (singleton) object by calling the 
AccessControlUtil.getInstance() method. Then you can call the desired 




() returns an instance of OAuthorizationCredentials that contains the 
userId and accessToken of the authenticated user, and the clientId of the web 
application. 
8.4.3.4 Tag libraries 
A set of JSP and JSF tag libraries are provided to facilitate using authentication 
and authorisation in OpenIoT applications. We explain how to use JSF taglib 
here. Using JSP taglib is similar. 
In order to be able to use JSF taglib in an XHTML page, we need to declare the 
openiot namespace by adding 




for (RegisteredService registeredService : services) { 
    String name = registeredService.getName(); 
    // Checking access 
    if (AccessControlUtil.getInstance().hasPermission("admin:user_mgmt:" + 
name)) 
        allServices.put(registeredService.getId(), registeredService); 
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The available tags are presented in Table 6: 
Tag Description 
<openiot:hasPermission name="PERM_NAME"> 
Renders the tag body if the user has the 
permission specified by PERM_NAME 
<openiot:lacksPermission name="PERM_NAME"> 
Does not render the tag body if the user 
lacks the permission specified by 
PERM_NAME 
<openiot:hasRole name="ROLE_NAME"> 
Renders the tag body if the user has the 
role specified by ROLE_NAME 
<openiot:laksRole name="ROLE_NAME"> 
Does not render the tag body if the user 
lacks the role specified by ROLE_NAME 
    <openiot:hasAnyRoles name="ROLE_NAME1, 
ROLE_NAME2, ..."> 
Renders the tag body if the user has at 
least one of the roles specified by 
ROLE_NAME1, ROLE_NAME2, etc. 
Table 6. JSF tags provided by the the security client module 
   
The security client module also provides JSF tags for Apache Shiro (shiro-faces). 
In order to use these tags in your XHML document, declare Shiro's namespace in 
your documents by adding 
xmlns:shiro="http://shiro.apache.org/tags" to the html tag. The 
following tags can be used in your JSF pages (other Shiro tags are not 
recommended to be used): 
 <shiro:user> renders the tag body if the user is authenticated 
 <shiro:guest> renders the tag body if the user is not authenticated 
 <shiro:principal 
type="org.pac4j.oauth.profile.casoauthwrapper.CasOAuthWrapperPr
ofile" property="id"/> displays the username of the user if the user is 
authenticated 
8.4.4  RESTful Usage 
The security client module can be used in modules that do not directly interact 
with users but need to implement access control to fulfil user requests. 
 
8.4.4.1 Configuration 
In order to use the security client, first obtain an instance of 
org.openiot.security.client.AccessControlUtil configured for 
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If one of the methods that take "module-name" as parameter is used, then the 
security module first looks for a file named rest-client-MODULE_NAME.ini in the 
configuration directory. “module-name” is the name of the module that is using the 
security client. MODULE_NAME refers to the same name. If the configuration 
directory is not specified by passing the “config-dir” parameter to the method, the 
JBoss configuration folder is considered as the configuration directory. If the 
method with no parameter is called for obtaining an instance of the 
AccessControlUtil class, then you must create a file named rest-client.ini in the 
classpath. If rest-client-MODULE_NAME.ini is not found, in case of using one the 
first two methods, the security client falls back to rest-client.ini in the classpath for 
reading the configuration parameters. The content of the configuration file should 
be similar to the following example. The values must be modified to conform to 
the setting of your module. 
In this configuration file, the following parameters are to be modified by the 
module developers if needed: 
 casOauthClient.casOAuthRestUrl property specifies the address of the 
OAuth provider for RESTful authentication. It refers to the address of the 
OpenIoT CAS server. If the OpenIoT CAS is deployed in a different place, 
this URL must be updated accordingly. 
 casOauthClient.key designates the clientID of the service and 
casOauthClient.secret specifies its secret.  
 clientsRealm.permissionsURL is the URL on the OAuth provider for 
retrieving permissions of the authenticated user. If the OpenIoT CAS is 
deployed in a different place, this URL must be updated accordingly. 
 
 
If the method that takes the name of your module as parameter is used to obtain 
an instance of the AccessControlUtil class, then you can provide the key and 
secret of your client in the global openiot.properties file as follows: 
[main] 
casOauthClient = org.openiot.security.client.rest.CasOAuthWrapperClientRest 
casOauthClient.casOAuthUrl = https://localhost:8443/openiot-cas/oauth2.0 
casOauthClient.casOAuthRestUrl = https://localhost:8443/openiot-
cas/openiot1/tickets 
casOauthClient.key = testservice1 
casOauthClient.secret = testsecret1 
clients = org.pac4j.core.client.Clients 
clients.callbackUrl = http://localhost:8080/sth/callback 
clients.clientsList = $casOauthClient 
clientsRealm = org.openiot.security.client.rest.CasOAuthClientRealmRest 
clientsRealm.permissionsURL = https://localhost:8443/openiot-
cas/oauth2.0/permissions 
clientsRealm.defaultRoles = ROLE_USER 
clientsRealm.clients = $clients 
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 casOauthClient.key.MODULE_NAME=CLIENT_KEY 
 casOauthClient.secret.MODULE_NAME=CLIENT_SECRET 
CLIENT_KEY and CLIENT_SECRET should be replaced by the key and secret of 
your module. If these properties are found in openiot.properties, they override the 
key and secret specified in the ini configuration file. 
8.4.4.2 SSL Troubleshooting 
If the security server (the OpenIoT CAS) is deployed on a host other than the 
localhost and the server has a self-signed certificate, you might get the following 
error: 
javax.net.ssl.SSLPeerUnverifiedException: peer not 
authenticated 
In this case, you need to add the server's certificate to the list of trusted 
certificates of the JVM. One way of doing that is by performing the following 
steps: 
1. echo -n | openssl s_client -connect SERVER_ADDRESS:8443 | 
sed -ne '/-BEGIN CERTIFICATE-/,/-END CERTIFICATE-/p' > 
SERVER_ADDRESS.cert 




Replace SERVER_ADDRESS with the address of the server and JRE_PATH with 
the path of your JRE. If jssecacerts does not exist, use cacerts instead. 
8.4.4.3 Authentication and Authorisation 
Having obtained, for example in a variable named restInstance, an instance 
of org.openiot.security.client.AccessControlUtil configured for 
RESTful authentication and authorisation, the following functionality is accessible. 
 For logging in and obtaining a token, use restInstance.login() 
method and provide your username and password. 
 Use restInstance.getOAuthorizationCredentials() to obtain 
an OAuthorizationCredentials object containing the acesstoken, 
clientId, userId, and the full resource URI of userId. 
 For logging out and destroying the token, use 
restInstance.logout(). 
After having made sure that your application has been authenticated, it is 
straightforward to check if a user has a role or permission for your application or 
another service. 
Assume that your OpenIoT application (e.g., SD&UM) is called A and has the 
clientId serviceA and token tokenA. A web application (e.g., Request-
Presentation) called C with clientId serviceC requests one of your services on 
behalf of user U. User U has been authenticated. Token tokenU has been 
assigned to C (because in a web application, the token is given to the application 
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instead of the user). For fulfilling the C's request, you need to check if U is 
permitted to access the requested resource(s) on your application. You can write 
a similar code as the following: 
 
Now, assume that C is requesting a service from an OpenIoT service provider B 
(e.g., LSM), having clientId serviceB and token tokenB. For fulfilling this request, 
B needs to use a service from your application. For fulfilling the B's request you 
need to check if U is permitted to access the requested resource(s) on your 
application. You can write a similar code as the following: 
 
Notes: 
 The same procedure can be used for testing if a user has a specific role, 
using AccessControlUtil.hasRole(..) methods. 
 OAuthorizationCredentials allows more than two callers to be chained, but 
this must be avoided. If the chain contains two credentials (including the 
credentials of the current application), the second credentials is used as 
user's credentials. If the chain contains three credentials (including the 
credentials of the current application), the third credentials is used as 
user's credentials. If the chain contains more than three credentials, the 
rest is ignored. 
String permissionString = ... 
AccessControlUtil instance = AccessControlUtil.getRestInstance(); 
OAuthorizationCredentials callerCredentials = new 
OAuthorizationCredentials(tokenU, serviceC, null); 
OAuthorizationCredentials credentials = new 
OAuthorizationCredentials(tokenA, serviceA, callerCredentials); 
if(instance.hasPermission(permissionString, credentials)){ 
    // Proceed with fulfilling the request 
} else { 
    // Deny fulfilling the request 
} 
String permissionString = ... 
AccessControlUtil instance = AccessControlUtil.getRestInstance(); 
OAuthorizationCredentials userCredentials = new 
OAuthorizationCredentials(tokenU, serviceC, null); 
OAuthorizationCredentials callerCredentials = new 
OAuthorizationCredentials(tokenB, serviceB, userCredentials); 
OAuthorizationCredentials credentials = new 
OAuthorizationCredentials(tokenA, serviceA, callerCredentials); 
if(instance.hasPermission(permissionString, credentials)){ 
    // Proceed with fulfilling the request 
} else { 
    // Deny fulfilling the request 
} 
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 In cases where you need to check if a user is authorized to access some 
resources on another OpenIoT service rather than your application, there 
are variants of the above methods that take a targetClientId parameter. 
Your application is allowed to do this only if it has the permission 
"ext:retrieve_permissions" on the target OpenIoT service provider 
denoted by targetClientId. 
8.4.4.4 Sample Restful Usage 
X-GSN, LSM-Light.Server, Scheduler, and SD&UM modules are configured to 
use the RESTful security client utilities. For each of these modules, please refer 
to the corresponding section in the rest of this chapter for detailed configuration 
and usage information. 
8.4.5  Cache Configuration 
In order to reduce the traffic between your application and the OpenIoT CAS, the 
security client can cache the authorisation information it retrieves from the 
OpenIoT CAS. In order to activate caching you need to add the following in the 
Shiro configuration file (web-client[-MODULE_NAME].ini or rest-client[-
MODULE_NAME].ini). 
 
We use Ehcache7 cache provider. cacheManager.cacheManagerConfigFile 
specifies the Ehcache configuration file. For example in the above configuration, 
Shiro will look for a file named ehcache-sec-client.xml in the classpath. A 
sample configuration file can be found in security-
client/src/test/resources. Instead of the classpath: prefix you can use 
url:, file: or simply provide a valid path to the configuration file without any prefix. 
In Ehcache configuration file, you can change the default values in defaultCache 
element. Particularly, tune timeToIdleSeconds and timeToLiveSeconds 
parameters. 
Great attention must be given to using caching, otherwise you might give 
permissions to users while their tokens have been expired or they don't have 
those permissions anymore. You can clean the whole cache by calling: 
AccessControlUtil.getAuthorizationManager().clearCache(null)
; 
The authorisation information for the current user can be removed from the cache 
by calling AccessControlUtil.reset(). 
8.4.6  Token Expiry  
Since tokens are represented only by a string, the only way to find out if a token 
has been expired is to contact the OpenIoT CAS by calling hasPermission() 
                                            
7 http://ehcache.org/ 
cacheManager = org.apache.shiro.cache.ehcache.EhCacheManager 
cacheManager.cacheManagerConfigFile=classpath:ehcache-sec-client.xml 
securityManager.cacheManager = $cacheManager 
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or hasRole() and check for an exception of type 
AccessTokenExpiredException. Since this exception is a runtime exception, 
you don't need to surround every call to hasPermission() or hasRole() 
methods by try-catch blocks. In a web application you can instruct your container 
to forward the user to a specific page when this exception occurs. 
AccessTokenExpiredException.getToken() returns the token that is 
expired. 
The above approach is not reliable if we enable caching. AccessControlUtil 
also provides the method 
getExpiredAccessToken(OAuthorizationCredentials 
credentials). This method returns the first expired token in credentials, if 
there is any. Otherwise, it returns null. 
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9 INTEGRATION OF OPENIOT COMPONENTS WITH THE 
SECURITY FRAMEWORK 
All OpenIoT modules are integrated with the security module, in the sense that 
they implement access control using the means provided by the security module 
components. In the following we describe how this integration is done for each 
OpenIoT module.  
9.1  LSM Server  
A rest-client.ini file is provided in lsm-light.server/src/main/resources/ 
assuming the OpenIoT CAS is deployed on localhost. A recommended practice is 
to copy this file to the JBoss configuration folder and rename it to rest-client-lsm-
server.ini. The username and password of the user assigned to the LSM-Server 
module is configured in openiot.properties file using 
security.initialize.lsmserver.username and security.initialize.lsmserver.password 
properties.  
The utility class org.openiot.lsm.utils.SecurityUtil is provided for 
authentication and authorisation tasks. It logs in the OpenIoT CAS using the 
username and password read from openiot.properties file. The token that is 
obtained from the security server is used when calling 
AccessControlUtil.getPermission() methods. Each request to the LSM 
server must contain the access token and clienId of the requesting application. 
They are retrieved from the HttpServletRequest object. The following code 
snipped shows an example of access check in the LSM Server: 
 
9.2  X-GSN 
A rest-client-xgsn.ini file is provided in x-gsn/conf/ directory assuming the 
OpenIoT CAS is deployed on localhost. The username and password of the user 
assigned to the X-GSN module is configured in application.conf file using 
username and password properties. 
The utility class org.openiot.gsn.utils.CASUtils is provided for 
authentication and authorisation tasks. It logs in the OpenIoT CAS using the 
username and password read from application.conf. The token that is obtained 
String token = request.getHeader("token"); 
String clientId = request.getHeader("clientId"); 
String permissionString = "lsm-light.server.main:delSensor"; 
ServletContext context = getServletContext(); 
if(SecurityUtil.hasPermission(permissionString , context, token, clientId) 
{ 
 sensorManager.sensorDelete(graphURL,infos); 
} else { 
 result ="You don't have permission to operate this function"; 
 logger.info(result); 
} 
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from the security server is sent with each request to the LSM Server when 
publishing sensor data as the following code snippet shows. 
 
9.3  Scheduler 
A rest-client.ini file is provided in scheduler.core/src/main/resources/ 
assuming the OpenIoT CAS is deployed on localhost. A recommended practice is 
to copy this file to the JBoss configuration folder and rename it to rest-client-
scheduler.ini. The username and password of the user assigned to the Scheduler 
module is configured in openiot.properties file using 
security.initialize.scheduler.username and security.initialize.scheduler.password 
properties.  
The utility class org.openiot.scheduler.core.utils.SecurityUtil is 
provided for authentication and authorisation tasks. It logs in the OpenIoT CAS 
using the username and password read from openiot.properties file. The token 
that is obtained from the security server is used when calling 
AccessControlUtil.getPermission() methods. This token is also sent 
with each request to the LSM Server as the following code snippet shows. 
 
Other modules that call services form the Scheduler must include their access 
token and clientId in the request. The following code snippet shows the 
permission control in the discoverSensors() method. 
 
LSMTripleStore lsmStore = new LSMTripleStore(lsmServer); 
OAuthorizationCredentials cred = CASUtils.getTokenAndId();             
sensorID = lsmStore.sensorAdd(sensor, cred.getClientId(), 
cred.getAccessToken());       





public SensorTypes discoverSensors(@QueryParam("userID") String userID, 
@QueryParam("longitude") double longitude, @QueryParam("latitude") double latitude, 
@QueryParam("radius") float radius, @QueryParam("clientId") String clientId, 
@QueryParam("token") String token) { 
if(!SecurityUtil.hasPermission(PermissionsUtil.SCHEDULER_ALL, token,  
clientId)){ 
  logger.info("Missing required permissions"); 
  return null; 
 } 
 DiscoverSensorsImpl discoverSensorsImpl = new DiscoverSensorsImpl(userID, 
 longitude, latitude, radius); 
 return discoverSensorsImpl.getSensorTypes(); 
} 
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9.4  SDUM 
A rest-client.ini file is provided in sdum.core/src/main/resources/ 
assuming the OpenIoT CAS is deployed on localhost. A recommended practice is 
to copy this file to the JBoss configuration folder and rename it to rest-client-
sdum.ini. The username and password of the user assigned to the SD&UM 
module is configured in openiot.properties file using 
security.initialize.sdum.username and security.initialize.sdum.password 
properties.  
The utility class org.openiot.sdum.core.utils.SecurityUtil is 
provided for authentication and authorisation tasks. It logs in the OpenIoT CAS 
using the username and password read from openiot.properties file. The token 
that is obtained from the security server is used when calling 
AccessControlUtil.getPermission() methods. Other modules that call 
services form the SD&UM must include their access token and clientId in the 
request. The following code snippet shows the permission control in the 
pollForReport() method. 
 
9.5  Request Definition 
A web-client.ini file is provided in 
ui.requestDefinition/src/main/resources/ assuming the OpenIoT 
CAS is deployed on localhost. A recommended practice is to copy this file to the 
JBoss configuration folder and rename it to web-client- requestDefinition.ini. 
While accessing the main page of the request definition web application, if the 
user is not logged in, she will be redirected to the login page provided by the 
OpenIoT CAS. The code snippet below shows how this is done. 
 
@GET @Path("/pollforreport") 
public SdumServiceResultSet pollForReport(@QueryParam("serviceID") String 
applicationID, @QueryParam("clientId") String clientId, @QueryParam("token") String 
token) { 
 if(!SecurityUtil.hasPermission(PermissionsUtil.SDUM_ALL, token, clientId)){ 
  logger.info("Missing required permissions"); 
  return null; 
 } 
 PollForReportImpl pollForReportImpl = new PollForReportImpl(applicationID); 
 return pollForReportImpl.getSdumServiceResultSet(); 
} 
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When calling a service from the Scheduler, the web application adds the user 
token and its clientId to the request parameters as the code below shows. 
 
9.6  Request Presentation 
A web-client.ini file is provided in 
ui.requestPresentation/src/main/resources/ assuming the OpenIoT CAS 
is deployed on localhost. A recommended practice is to copy this file to the JBoss 
configuration folder and rename it to web-client- requestPresentation.ini. While 
accessing the main page of the request presentation web application, if the user 
is not logged in, she will be redirected to the login page provided by the OpenIoT 
CAS. The code snippet below shows how this is done. 
 
 
When calling a service from the SD&UM, the web application adds the user token 
and its clientId to the request parameters as the code below shows. 
AccessControlUtil acUtil = AccessControlUtil.getInstance(); 
if(acUtil.getOAuthorizationCredentials() == null){ 
 HttpServletResponse response = (HttpServletResponse) 
FacesContext.getCurrentInstance().getExternalContext().getResponse(); 
 HttpServletRequest req = (HttpServletRequest) 
FacesContext.getCurrentInstance().getExternalContext().getRequest(); 
 acUtil.redirectToLogin(req, response); 
} 
AccessControlUtil acUtil = AccessControlUtil.getInstance(); 
OAuthorizationCredentials creds = acUtil.getOAuthorizationCredentials(); 
ClientRequestFactory factory = new ClientRequestFactory(SCHEDULER_HOST_URL); 






AccessControlUtil acUtil = AccessControlUtil.getInstance(); 
if(acUtil.getOAuthorizationCredentials() == null){ 
 HttpServletResponse response = (HttpServletResponse) 
FacesContext.getCurrentInstance().getExternalContext().getResponse(); 
 HttpServletRequest req = (HttpServletRequest) 
FacesContext.getCurrentInstance().getExternalContext().getRequest(); 
 acUtil.redirectToLogin(req, response); 
} 
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AccessControlUtil acUtil = AccessControlUtil.getInstance(); 
OAuthorizationCredentials creds = acUtil.getOAuthorizationCredentials(); 
ClientRequestFactory factory = new ClientRequestFactory(SDUM_HOST_URL); 
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10 CONCLUSIONS 
In this document we presented the foundations of the security/privacy framework 
in OpenIoT. The main feature of the security/privacy architecture is the use of the 
Central Authorisation Server (CAS) for authorizing applications running on behalf 
a user by granting them an access token with a given time to live. This prevents 
any circulation of the credentials throughout OpenIoT components. 
We have also provided an overview of the currently implemented prototype. The 
documentation for how to use and configure the prototype can be found on the 
OpenIoT wiki. We have described how we adapted Jasig CAS for authentication 
and authorisation, which allows flexible multi-protocol Single Sign-On (SSO) 
capabilities. We have shown how CAS can be configured to act as an OAuth2.0 
server, which we referred to as OpenIoT CAS. We also explained the internals of 
the other two modules of the security framework, namely the Management 
Console, and Security Client. The overall authentication and authorisation 
approach in each module is explained in full details. 
Finally, we have detailed how all OpenIoT modules have been integrated with the 
security module, in the sense that they implement access control using the 
means provided by the security module components. A complete description has 
been provided for each core module. 
This document presents the second and final part of the security/privacy 
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